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ABSTRACT

THE NETWORK DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE IN THE WISDOM OF CROWDS
Joshua Becker
Damon Centola

Research on the wisdom of crowds is motivated by the observation that the average belief in a
large group can be accurate even when group members are individually inaccurate. A common
theoretical assumption in previous research is that accurate group beliefs can emerge only when
group members are statistically independent. However, network models of belief formation suggest
that the effect of social influence depends on the structure of social networks. We present a
theoretical overview and two experimental studies showing that, under the right conditions, social
influence can improve the accuracy of both individual group members and the group as a whole.
The results support the argument that interacting groups can produce collective intelligence that
surpasses the collected intelligence of independent individuals.
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PREFACE

Research on the “wisdom of crowds” is motivated by the observation that the average belief of a
large group of people can be surprisingly accurate, even when the group is composed of members
who are individually inaccurate. Due to the theoretical importance of informational diversity, a key
premise in prior research on the wisdom of crowds has been that groups will be accurate only when
their members are statistically independent (Hong, Du, Wang, Fan, & Xu, 2016; Lorenz, Rauhut,
Schweitzer, & Helbing, 2011; Nofer & Hinz, 2014). Intuitively, this claim is based on the idea that
people who are independent have errors who are independent, and therefore those errors will
cancel out in large numbers. When people influence each other, conformity pressure can produce
herding dynamics (Banerjee, 1992) and groupthink (Janis, 1982), undermining the wisdom of
crowds (Surowiecki, 2004).
In contrast with this common theoretical assumption, this dissertation argues that a careful
examination of the theoretical principles underpinning the wisdom of crowds suggests that social
influence will not always undermine group accuracy. Instead, I argue that the effect of social
influence on belief accuracy is contingent on the structure of social networks, and that social
influence can improve belief accuracy when mediated through structured information exchange. In
order to test this theory, we conduct two experiments using an online platform in which subjects
completed estimation tasks both before and after observing the belief of others.

In each

experiment, we also study a control group, in which subjects revise their beliefs without social
information. This design allows us to compare independent belief formation with social belief
formation, thus controlling for any individual learning process. The first experiment uses general
trivia tasks, and the analysis focuses on accuracy at the group level. The second experiment
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studies a task of practical interest—financial forecasting—and the analysis focuses on individual
accuracy.
This dissertation begins with a review of research on the wisdom of crowds, presented in
Chapter 1. In order to present a comprehensive description of group belief formation, this first
chapter not only reviews previous research but also draws on the results of the experiments
described in this dissertation, placing them in context with the broader literature. In this chapter, I
argue that research on the wisdom of crowds can be described in terms of two theoretical
orientations.

Research on “collected intelligence” follows a crowdsourcing paradigm which

aggregates the collected beliefs of many independent individuals, using psychological and
statistical principles to extract the most accurate estimate possible. In contrast, research on
“collective intelligence” studies the social processes of belief formation, and shows how groups can
process information in ways that cannot be reduced to a statistical aggregation of independent
individuals. I argue on this basis that statistical models of belief formation cannot be fully defined
using the distribution of individual member characteristics alone, which assumes that individuals
are independent conditional on those characteristics. Though this approach often serves as a
useful approximation, a complete explanation of group belief formation must also account for the
social network structure. Network models of belief formation demonstrate that no one person’s
belief can be predicted without knowing the beliefs of their peers, whose beliefs in turn depend on
their peers, and so on, such that the entire network shapes a single individual’s belief.
Following this review, Chapter 2 describes an experiment designed to test the effect of
social influence on the accuracy of the average belief in a group. This study describes novel
theoretical results showing how social influence can improve the accuracy of the average belief in
a group, but only when groups are embedded in social networks where each individual is connected
to an equal number of others (a “decentralized” social network). In contrast, when groups are
characterized by the presence of disproportionately influential members (a “centralized” social
network), the accuracy of the group depends only on the accuracy of those highly influential
“central” individuals.
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One key principle of the wisdom of crowds is that the accuracy of the average belief is
mathematically distinct from the average accuracy of individual beliefs—i.e., the error of the
average is not equivalent to the average error. This statement, of course, reflects the core principle
of crowd wisdom—groups can be accurate even when individuals are inaccurate. However, this
statement also means that special care must be taken not only to understand how social influence
impacts group-level (average) beliefs, but also to understand how social influence impacts
individual beliefs.

Chapter 3 presents an analysis designed to specifically examine the role of

social influence on individual accuracy.

This chapter also tackles another limitation of the

experiment described in Chapter 2: while Chapter 2 describes an experiment in which subjects
complete simple trivia-like estimation tasks (e.g., counting the number of gumballs in a jar), the
experiment in Chapter 3 tests the wisdom of crowds in a context of practical importance: financial
forecasting.
Although each chapter in this dissertation is intended to stand alone as an academic paper
(and thus some theoretical repetition should be expected) they also work in concert to form a
coherent whole, a single thesis. Taken together, the research presented in this dissertation
advances our understanding of the wisdom of crowds in several ways.

Chapter 2 builds on a

model of the wisdom of crowds (DeGroot, 1974) which predicts that social belief formation is
governed by network structure. As described in Chapter 1, this model in its simplest form predicts
that decentralized networks will converge directly on the mean of independent beliefs, such that
social influence neither helps nor harms group accuracy. However, we found empirically that
individuals who were more accurate also were less responsive to social influence. Simulations
described in Chapter 2 predict that this process will lead to a systematic increase in the accuracy
of the average belief in a group, when that group is embedded in a decentralized network. Thus,
chapter 2 not only provides an empirical test of network theories of social influence, but also
contributes a novel and empirically motivated theoretical prediction: social influence can improve
the accuracy of group beliefs.
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The results described in Chapter 3, however, do not replicate this finding:

in this

experiment, groups appear to converge directly on the mean of independent beliefs. While we
cannot rule out the possibility of Type II error (i.e., the effects may simply be too weak to observe
given the inherent noise associated with financial forecasting, or the observation that groups were
accurate to begin with) the results presented in Chapter 3 ultimately serve to highlight an incredibly
robust principle of the wisdom of crowds: individuals are nearly always going to become more
accurate as a result of information exchange, even when the average belief does not change
appreciably. In simulation, we find that increased accuracy of individuals is a robust phenomenon
that is expected to hold under a wide range of empirically plausible assumptions. As discussed in
both Chapter 1 and Chapter 3, the theoretical prediction that social influence can improve the
accuracy of individuals follows very directly from the statistical principles of the wisdom of crowds.
Nonetheless, this theoretical prediction is remarkably absent from prior research on the wisdom of
crowds, and thus offers a novel and important theoretical contribution.
Taken together, the theoretical and empirical results presented in this dissertation provide
a crucial correction to previous research on the wisdom of crowds, which commonly assumed that
social influence undermines the wisdom of crowds. In contrast with this common assumption, the
results presented here demonstrate that social influence in structured networks can improve belief
accuracy at both the group level and the individual level.
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CHAPTER 1: THE WISDOM OF CROWDS

Abstract
The wisdom of crowds is an empirical phenomenon that occurs when the average belief in a large
group is accurate even when individuals are inaccurate. Although large groups are not guaranteed
to produce accurate beliefs, statistical principles guarantee that the group belief will always be more
accurate than the belief of a randomly selected individual. In this review, we describe research on
the wisdom of crowds, observing that theoretical and empirical studies can be grouped into two
general paradigms. Under the "collected intelligence" paradigm, researchers collect data from
individuals, ideally independent, in order to generate aggregated crowd-sourced estimates. Under
the "collective intelligence" paradigm, researchers examine how social processes shape belief
formation in ways that cannot be explained solely in terms of the statistical distribution of
independent individuals. This latter body of research has found that groups can actively process
information to produce estimates that are more accurate than the aggregated beliefs of
independent individuals.

We argue that the wisdom of crowds represents a distinct social

phenomenon, and we distinguish research on belief accuracy from social learning, collective
problem solving, and coordination in networks.

Introduction
Research on the wisdom of crowds is motivated by the observation that the average belief in a
large group of people can be surprisingly accurate, even when group members are individually
inaccurate. This remarkable observation was made unexpectedly by Galton in 1907, who expected
to find the ignorance of crowds, and the wisdom of crowds and has since been observed in a wide
range of topic domains including financial investment (Kelley & Tetlock, 2013; Nofer & Hinz, 2014),
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medical diagnoses (Kurvers et al., 2016; Wolf, Krause, Carney, Bogart, & Kurvers, 2015), visual
search tasks (Juni & Eckstein, 2017), geopolitical forecasting (Atanasov et al., 2016a; Mellers et
al., 2014), and sports betting (Herzog & Hertwig, 2011; Peeters, 2018). Although the wisdom of
crowds is an empirically motivated phenomenon, the ability for groups to generate accurate
judgements can be theoretically explained by a set of basic statistical principles. One key principle
is known as the “crowd beats average” law (Page, 2007) and can be derived readily from the wellknown bias-variance decomposition for a statistical estimator. While these principles do not
promise any minimum accuracy for group beliefs, they do provide a mathematical guarantee that
the crowd belief, measured as the mean of individual beliefs, will be always more accurate than the
belief of an average individual.
Early efforts to replicate this finding measured simple laboratory tasks such as estimating
the weight of objects (Bruce, 1935; Gordon, 1924) and identifying the temperature in a classroom
(Knight, 1921 as cited by Klugman, 1945). Belief aggregation has since shown a great deal of
potential for practical application. Wolf et al (2015) tested several methods to pool the judgements
of radiologists classifying mammography screenings, finding that no matter what aggregation rule
was used, the pooled judgement provided both a greater number of true positives (correct
identifications of cancer) and fewer false negatives (incorrect categorizations as healthy) than a
randomly selected individual. These findings have been replicated with other classification tasks,
including other medical procedures (Wolf et al., 2015) and are expected to hold for more general
tasks such as surveillance and search-and-rescue (Juni & Eckstein, 2017). Sports fans (Peeters,
2018) and amateur financial analysts (Nofer & Hinz, 2014) have also been found to demonstrate
the wisdom of crowds, and it is likely that aggregated beliefs will continue to be found useful for
many types of estimates.
One particular area of interest is the prediction of future events. In 1944, Klugman (1947)
surveyed soldiers to estimate when armistice would be reached in World War II. They found that
the mean estimate for armistice was more accurate than 85% of individual estimates. Aggregated
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beliefs have become a common tool for forecasting the outcome of democratic elections (Murr,
2015), with so-called “citizen forecasts” outperforming even formal statistical models when properly
calibrated (Graefe, 2014). In addition to geopolitical forecasting, estimate aggregation has become
a widely adopted method for economic forecasting. Economic forecasts can range from macrolevel predictions about metrics such as GDP (Jansen, Jin, & de Winter, 2016; Mellers et al., 2014)
to firm-specific forecasts for such metrics as earnings and revenue (Drogen & Jha, 2013). It is
important to note that in the context of economic forecasting, predictions are not only based on
subjective estimates but are also based on formal statistical models. Clemen (1989) notes that
researchers have reached nearly unanimous agreement that the combination of estimates—
whether formal models, subjective beliefs, or a combination of the two—produces more accurate
estimates than any individual or model alone. Whether subjective human judgement alone can
outperform formal models depends on circumstances. Jansen et al. (2016) found that under typical
market conditions where statistical models can be well calibrated with reliable data, formal
statistical models outperform human judgement. However, they argue that human judgement
offers better predictions than formal models under atypical conditions such as economic crises,
when the assumptions of formal models break down.
A common explanation for the wisdom of crowds is that each individual forms some belief
about the state of the world, plus or minus some individual error term, such that collections of
independent individuals have independent errors that cancel out in large groups (Hogarth, 1978; L.
Hong & Page, 2009). One prominent research paradigm, building on this statistical premise,
attempts to identify how to best use crowd-sourced beliefs to produce accurate forecasts and other
estimates. This research tests different ways to combine individual estimates into a single wisdomof-crowd estimate, including methods such as weighting beliefs according to respondents
confidence (Koriat, 2012; Kurvers et al., 2016; Prelec, Seung, & McCoy, 2017) or prior accuracy
(Budescu & Chen, 2014; Mannes, Soll, & Larrick, 2014).
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In contrast with this collected intelligence paradigm, in which each individual independently
contributes their perspective, a growing body of evidence has shown that groups can actively
process information to produce beliefs that are more accurate than those of independent
individuals. Research in this second paradigm shows how collective intelligence can produce
accurate beliefs through social processes that are irreducible to collections of independent
individuals. Research on social influence has not only been helpful in refining the accuracy of
aggregation methods (Kao et al., 2018; Madirolas & de Polavieja, 2015), but is also important to
understanding situations where the outcome of interest is endogenous belief formation, rather than
an estimate generated by an outside party. Even when the ability for an outside aggregator to form
accurate beliefs is of little interest, the population distribution of beliefs may be inherently
meaningful, as in organizational behavior and democratic processes.
This article will begin by reviewing formal theoretical models of group accuracy and
discussing the notion of independence in the wisdom of crowds. Statistical models of the wisdom
of crowds do allow for correlation between individual beliefs, but nonetheless are always consistent
with the assumption that individuals are conditionally independent. Conditionally independent
beliefs may be correlated, for example, if two people share the same information source; those
people are assumed to be independent conditional on that shared information (as in multilevel
regression). In contrast, network models of social influence show that a person’s belief at any point
in time cannot be fully explained without accounting for the beliefs of their peers and the influence
those peers have on them. After laying out this statistical framework, we review research on
estimates based on the collection of many individual beliefs. This research can be described in
terms of a statistical or machine learning framework: researchers identify and optimize a function
that maps data to an estimate. Following this section, we review theoretical models and empirical
research on the effect of social influence on belief accuracy. Finally, we close with a discussion of
related models of collective intelligence, defining the wisdom of crowds against processes such as
coordination and problem solving.
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Statistical Foundations for the Wisdom of Crowds
The ability for groups (either groups of people or groups of models) to produce judgements whose
accuracy exceeds that of any individual can be explained by a model in which each individual
estimate is composed of the true value, plus an error term:
𝑥𝑖 = (θ + ε𝑖 )

(1)

where xi is the judgement of the ith individual, θ is the true value to be estimated, and εi is the error
of the ith individual (Hogarth, 1978; L. Hong & Page, 2009). Under the assumption that εi is
distributed identically and independently for all individuals, and that E[ε]=0, then the expected error
of the mean—that is, collective error—will decrease as the group size increases, and approach the
true value. However, the assumption that E[ε]=0 is unlikely to hold in the vast majority of empirical
contexts. In most circumstances, people’s beliefs are subject to common cognitive biases, which
lead to systematic errors, such that a population will tend to regularly under- or over-estimate the
true value (Kahneman & Tversky, 1977; Kao et al., 2018).

The Diversity Prediction Theorem. Fortunately, a well-known statistical regularity proves that the
aggregated belief within a large population will always offer an accuracy benefit regardless of the
presence of systematic bias (L. Hong & Page, 2008; Page, 2007):
𝐸[𝑥
̅ − θ ]2 = 𝐸[(𝑥𝑖 − 𝜃)2 ] − 𝐸[(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥̅ )2 ] .

(2)

Equation 2 is well known in mathematical statistics, where it shows that the bias (error) of any
estimator (in this case, the error of the group average, indicated by the leftmost term) is equal to
the mean squared error (average individual error—the first term on the right) minus the variance
(belief diversity—the second term on the right). This statement has recently become known as the
“diversity prediction theorem” (Page, 2007) because it shows that the accuracy of the group
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estimate depends on both the accuracy of individual estimates as well their variance, or “diversity.”
One important implication of this statement is that when individual error is held constant, group
error decreases as diversity decreases.
The diversity prediction theorem also provides one of the fundamental principles of the
wisdom of crowds, what Page (2007) terms the “crowd beats averages” law. This law is based on
the fact that Equation 2 leads immediately to the inequality
𝐸[𝑥
̅ − θ]2 < 𝐸[(𝑥𝑖 − 𝜃)2 ]

(3)

which states that the error of the average estimate in a group (of any size) will always be lower than
the average error obtained from any individual estimate alone. Thus, the average belief in a group
will always be more accurate than a randomly selected individual belief. It should be noted that
this identity applies to any sample belief distribution, and is not true only in expectation. It should
also be noted that this identity does not require individuals to be independent.

Correlation Framework for the Wisdom of Crowds. A very similar principle, drawing on statistical
principles commonly used to measure psychometric instrument reliability, describes the
advantages of aggregation in terms of correlation (Hogarth, 1978). Where equation 1 assumes
that every individual belief is drawn from the same distribution, it may also be the case the individual
beliefs come from different distributions. This variation between individual belief distributions may
emerge if individuals are exposed to different signals, for example. In the context of forecasting,
such variation may occur if individuals have access to different data regarding the predicted
outcome. This variation may emerge even if individuals have access to the same data, but interpret
that data differently, reaching different conclusions (L. Hong & Page, 2008, 2009).
Together, these concepts imply a generative model in which each person’s belief is drawn
from some distinct distribution given by some particular instantiation of equation 1. The value E[ε i]
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for each distribution determines a person’s expected accuracy. In equation 2, expected error for
each individual is expressed in terms of mean squared error, but this concept can also be
expressed in terms of correlation with the true value. This “reliability” metric (Hogarth, 1978) for
accuracy asks: to what extent does a person’s prediction correlate with the true value? The notion
of correlation emerges from the assumption that an individual belief is drawn from some underlying
probability distribution. This correlation can be measured in practice when people make repeated
predictions over many trials (for example, predicting many future events).
In this conceptual framework, there are three correlations of interest: the reliability of the
group estimate, expressed as the correlation between the group mean and the true value; the
average reliability of the individual estimators; and the correlation between each individual
response. These three terms are related with the following equation given by Hogarth (1978):

𝜌𝑦𝑥̅ =

𝜌
̅ 𝑦𝑥
𝜌
̅𝑥 𝑥
𝑖 𝑗

.

(4)

This equation states that group reliability is equal to the ratio between the average individual
reliability and the correlation between individual estimates. Though equation 4 requires slightly
different assumptions and presents a different form than equation 2, it offers a very similar
statement. Equation 4 states that as average individual reliability (error) is held constant, and interindividual correlation is increased—thus increasing the similarity of individual estimates—group
reliability (error) will decrease. In other words, the more individual beliefs are correlated, the less
advantage the group estimate offers (Hogarth, 1978).

Types of Estimation Problems. Equations 2 and 4 make no assumption about the type of random
variable to be estimated, or the conditions under which those beliefs are formed, meaning they
apply to any kind of formal model or wisdom of crowds estimate, including those generated through
social information processing. This generality means that the wisdom of crowds principle—that the
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error of the group will always be lower than the error of the average individual—holds for any type
of belief that might be empirically useful. However, it is nonetheless important to distinguish
theoretically between two basic types of estimation task. In the vocabulary of machine learning or
statistical modeling, the two primary types of estimation are regression tasks, in which data (such
as the information available to an individual) is mapped to a numeric estimate; and classification
tasks, in which data is mapped to a single binary or categorical outcome. This distinction is
important because both empirical and theoretical research on the wisdom of crowds occasionally
yield divergent results depending on the which of the two estimation tasks is being studied. For
example, as will be discussed in more detail below, empirical findings for numeric beliefs point to a
very general correlation between accuracy and self-reported confidence or response to social
influence (Becker, Brackbill, & Centola, 2017; Madirolas & de Polavieja, 2015; Moussaïd, Kämmer,
Analytis, & Neth, 2013).

However, the correlation been accuracy and confidence for binary

classification tasks depends on whether common knowledge supports the correct or incorrect belief
(Koriat, 2012; Prelec et al., 2017). Further, while theoretical models of numeric estimates predict
that groups can always benefit from information exchange in networks where everyone is equally
influential, models of binary belief exchange predict that the effect of social influence depends on
the initial majority belief (Mossel & Tamuz, 2017).

Independence and the Wisdom of Crowds. When individual beliefs are assumed to be conditionally
independent, the group belief distribution can be described as a function of the population
distribution of individual characteristics such as demographic characteristics, information exposure,
expertise, and cognitive model. For example, a stock forecast might be determined by the framing
of the local news, the presence (or absence) of professional training, and the mental framework
the forecaster uses to map information to a belief. In terms of the model described above, these
factors all shape the conditionally independent probability distributions from which each individual
draws when making a forecast. The crowd is, when people are conditionally independent, a crowd
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of distributions. This “collected intelligence” paradigm implies that the observed belief distribution
can be described as a function of all the potentially conditioning variables: X= Ψ(I) where X is the
vector of individual beliefs, I is the matrix of individual characteristics, and Ψ is a function mapping
individual characteristics to individual beliefs.
While theoretical accounts of beliefs as conditionally independent generate a useful
approximation for a machine learning approach to the wisdom of crowds, these accounts do not
fully explain the formation of collective beliefs. To account for social influence, network models
describe group beliefs as a function of the initial distribution of beliefs as well as a weighted, directed
network of influence (Becker et al., 2017; DeGroot, 1974; Golub & Jackson, 2010). The effect of
social influence means that no person’s belief can be defined independently (even in expectation),
even if all of their individual characteristics are known, because each person’s belief depends not
only on the structure of the network in which they are embedded, but also on their precise location
within that network. This “collective intelligence” paradigm holds that the group belief distribution
must be defined as a function both of the distribution of individual characteristics and also the
network adjacency matrix: X= Ψ(I,A,t) where A is the network adjacency matrix and t is an index
for time, which is necessary due to the dynamic nature of belief formation in networks.
One implication of the collected intelligence paradigm, i.e. the assumption of conditional
independence, is that one sample of N people is equivalent in expectation to any other sample of
N people when the two samples are drawn from the same population: the only difference is
sampling error. However, the effective sample error of a group of N people embedded in a network
is larger than the sample error of N conditionally independent people. This difference emerges
from the fact that two identical groups can diverge as a result of social influence. Practically, this
additional variance means that researchers must take extra care when calculating standard errors
in statistical analysis. Conceptually, this additional variance means that two groups can generate
radically different beliefs even when they are composed of individuals who are in every measurable
way identical. The potential for two groups of identical individuals to produce different collective
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outcomes is a key principle of collective intelligence versus collected intelligence.

When

considering collective processes, one must not only account for the distribution of individual
characteristics, but must also account for distinctly group-level properties, most notably network
structure.

Nonetheless, the assumption of crowds as collections of independent individuals

provides a useful approximation, as indicated by the large body of research on crowdsourced
estimate accuracy.

Maximizing the Accuracy of Aggregation Estimates
There are many different approaches to generating an estimate based on the collection of individual
beliefs, all of which share a methodological orientation with machine learning: parameterize an
aggregation function from a set of training data, and then apply it to new data to form estimates or
predictions. As a wisdom of crowds estimator, the sample mean is one of many possible functions.
The mean is a useful theoretical metric due both to its conceptual simplicity and it’s mathematical
tractability; the equations above, for example, are convenient in part because they apply
equivalently to both numeric estimates and classification problems. In practice, however, there are
many different ways to aggregate group beliefs. Galton (1907) studied the median, arguing that
“According to the democratic principle of ‘one vote one value,’ the middlemost estimate expresses
the vox populi, every other estimate being condemned as too low or too high by a majority of the
voters.” Immediately following Galton’s publication, Hooker (1907) raised the question of whether
the mean was a better function. A substantial amount research on the wisdom of crowds seeks to
identify optimal functions for mapping crowd-sourced data to estimations.

Aggregation Methods. Ultimately, The optimal aggregation method depends on the properties of
the underlying belief distribution (Kao et al., 2018). Although it is unlikely that there is a single
function that’s optimal under all circumstances, certain general principles have nonetheless been
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found to produce more accurate aggregated estimates. For the aggregation of a single distribution
of estimates, with no additional information, Kao (2018) provides evidence that task-specific biases
can be identified and corrected once certain parameters of the belief distribution are known.
Estimates can be further improved by weighting aggregated beliefs more heavily towards those
individuals who demonstrated prior accuracy (Mannes et al., 2014). Budescu and Chen (2014)
note, however, that individual accuracy alone will not always identify those members who make the
greatest contributions to crowd accuracy. For example, if a forecaster only offers predictions for
future events that are easy to predict, they will have an apparently high accuracy. In order to
provide a better method for weighting individual contributions to accuracy, Budescu and Chen
weight forecasters by their relative contribution, which asks: how much more accurate is the crowd
estimate with this forecast added to the pool? This weights the resulting estimate more heavily
towards those individuals who are accurate when everyone else is inaccurate, and places less
weight on forecasters that are accurate only in situations when everyone is accurate.
Welinder, Branson, Perona, and Belongie (2010) go one step further and weight beliefs
according to three relevant characteristics for each contributor. Most notably, they distinguish
between bias (the tendency to under- or over-estimate in numeric estimates, or the tendency
toward false-positives or false-negatives in classification) and “competence,” which reflects an
individual’s consistency and is measured by standard deviation. These distinctions are important
because a person who is consistently wrong in a classification is in fact a remarkably useful data
source—the true classification will always be the opposite of what they say.

In addition to

measuring competence and bias, they also estimate contributors’ expertise, which allows individual
weights to vary across topic. This characteristic recognizes that an individual may have high
competence and low bias on some tasks, but low competence and high bias on other tasks.

Triangulating Multiple Data Types. In addition to weighting individuals by accuracy, estimates can
be improved by the collection of supplementary information such as reported confidence. Koriat
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(2012) studied binary choice questions and asked subjects to report confidence along with their
answers. They found that people who rate themselves as more confident are also more likely to
be correct, but that this effect is reversed when people’s beliefs are misled by common knowledge
(a finding replicated by Prelec et al., [2017]). These studies thus show that the accuracy of
confidence-weighted estimates can vary by task type, and research on medical decision-making
has found that confidence-weighting can indeed be useful in practically relevant contexts, as it can
be used to improve the accuracy of cancer diagnoses (Kurvers, 2016). Experiments on social
influence suggest that the relationship between confidence and accuracy is not limited to
classification estimates: for numeric estimates, accurate individuals tend to revise their beliefs less
in the presence of social information (Becker et al., 2017; Madirolas & de Polavieja, 2015). By
observing how individuals response to social information, a weighted estimate can be generated
using a process similar to that of confidence-weighted estimates (Madirolas & de Polavieja, 2015).
For classification problems, Prelec, Seung, and McCoy (2017) offer a solution to the
inconsistent relationship between confidence and accuracy. Prelec et al. asked subjects to provide,
in addition to their estimate, a statement about what they think other respondents answer will be.
When an answer receives more votes than responses would predict, that answer is termed the
“surprisingly popular answer.” Prelec et al. derive an argument from Bayesian probability theory
which predicts that the surprisingly popular answer is the most likely to be correct. Drawing on
datasets testing trivia knowledge, fine art valuation, and medical diagnoses, they find empirically
that this method provides estimates that are more accurate than either majority vote or confidenceweighted voting methods.
Triangulating the wisdom of crowds through supplementary data need not be limited to
survey data. The increasingly popular use of “digital trace data” for research (Lazer & Radford,
2017) has provided wisdom-of-crowds researchers with an array of data sources. In one study,
Nofer and Hinz (Nofer & Hinz, 2014) found that target stock prices posted in an online community
could be aggregated to produce forecasts that were more accurate than expert analysts. Bollen,
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Mao, and Zeng (2011) further show how digital content can be used for forecasting even when the
content itself is not an explicit forecast. They found that the emotional content of Twitter posts can
predict shifts in the Dow Jones Industrial Average several days in advance. While Bollen et al
studied only very broad market movements, Chen, De, Hu, and Hwang (2014) conducted a similar
form of text analysis on user posts to an online social network devoted to stock market discussion.
They argued that this data offered valuable predictive power for market returns on specific assets
even after controlling for information contained in traditional media sources.

Prediction Markets. One of the most popular methods for generating accurate crowd-sourced
forecasts is the use of prediction markets, in which individuals place a monetary bet on possible
outcomes for a future event. Prediction markets have been reviewed extensively elsewhere (Arrow
et al., 2008; Tziralis & Tatsiopoulos, 2012; Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004) and thus we will discuss them
only briefly here. In one common form, individual participants in a prediction market make a bet
between $0 and $1 on whether a future event will occur, earning $1 if their bet is correct and $0 if
their bet is incorrect.

Strictly speaking, participants in a prediction market are not socially

independent, because they observe the market price of a contract before making a purchase.
However, this influence does not appear to play a practically significant role, and theoretical models
can explain market prices based on the independent distribution of beliefs about the probability that
an event will happen. Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006) derive a theoretical model of price equilibrium
from a distribution of independent beliefs which shows how the market price can reflect the mean
belief. Empirical evidence supports this model, showing both that market prices reflect mean
beliefs and also that market prices are predictive of future events, such that an event trading at 60
cents will occur approximately 60% of the time (Cowgill & Zitzewitz, 2015; Wolfers & Zitzewitz,
2004)
While prediction markets typically involve very large populations, generating the necessary
market liquidity, these markets have also been found to provide an effective forecasting tool in more
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limited contexts such as corporate decision-making (Cowgill & Zitzewitz, 2015). Although efficient
and popular, prediction markets are not necessarily the optimal method for generating crowdsourced estimates. In one study that examined the generation of estimates for a wide range of
geopolitical outcomes, Atanasov et al (2016) found that prediction markets produced more accurate
estimates than simple belief aggregation, but that calibrated and weighted belief aggregation
produced the more accurate estimate than prediction markets.

Diversity and Group Composition. In addition to identifying optimal aggregation functions, another
important factor for the optimization of crowdsourced estimates is group composition—e.g.,
deciding whom to include on your team. Equations 2 and 4 above are commonly interpreted to
mean that the wisdom of crowds is maximized when groups are composed of individual whose
beliefs are uncorrelated or have a high variance—i.e., are “diverse” (H. Hong, Du, Wang, Fan, &
Xu, 2016; Lorenz, Rauhut, Schweitzer, & Helbing, 2011; Nofer & Hinz, 2014).

Hogarth (1978)

used equation 4 to show formally that the advantage of large groups decreases as the correlation
of individual beliefs increases (ceteris paribus). Similarly, Equation 2 indicates that an increase in
similarity (ceteris paribus) is accompanied by an increase in group error. Since social influence
has been found to increase the similarity between individual beliefs (Asch, 1951; Deutsch & Gerard,
1955), these mathematical principles are often interpreted (with inspiration from Surowiecki’s
popular 2004 book) to mean that the best crowd estimates are obtained when individual
contributors form their beliefs in isolation (H. Hong et al., 2016; Lorenz et al., 2011; Nofer & Hinz,
2014). However, as we will discuss below, the diversity prediction theorem also shows how social
influence can paradoxically increase belief accuracy, not in spite of but because of the increased
similarity between individuals.
While diversity is commonly measured as statistical variance, Page (2007) offers a more
subtle argument on the role of diversity in group belief formation. Page argues that variance alone
is not sufficient for diversity, but instead that what’s important is the diversity of cognitive models
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individuals use to form their beliefs (Economo, Hong, & Page, 2016). The idea of diverse cognitive
models is illustrated by the distinction between “interpreted signals” and “generated signals” (L.
Hong & Page, 2009). A generated signal is one in which an individual’s estimate or prediction is
fully determined by the signal they receive about the true state of the world, which is generated with
some random error as shown in equation 1. When signals are independent, the bias of the crowd
estimate is equal to the expected error of the signal. Variation in individual beliefs is explained by
either random noise, or exposure to different signals. An interpreted signal model, in contrast,
allows for every individual in a population to receive the same signal—i.e., the same information—
but nonetheless reach a different estimate or prediction, due to differing interpretations of that
information.

Conditional variation is explained by conditional use of different cognitive models,

operating on the same received information.
It is in this sense of interpreted models that Page (2007) argues for the importance of
diversity in a population, emphasized by their description of a crowd of people as a “crowd of
models.” Page points out that even if individuals are socially independent—such that they do not
influence each other directly—their beliefs will nonetheless be correlated (and share the same
expected error) if they all use the same predictive model. In order to obtain a greater diversity of
beliefs, Page advocates for assembling groups whose members use diverse predictive models.

The Social Dynamics of Collective Beliefs
Because social influence has been found to increase similarity between individual beliefs (Asch,
1951; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Sherif, 1935), the variance component of the diversity prediction
theorem has been invoked to argue that wise crowds must consist of individuals who are socially
independent, i.e. individuals who do not influence each other (H. Hong et al., 2016; Lorenz et al.,
2011; Nofer & Hinz, 2014). However, the critical limitation of this argument is the “ceteris paribus”
assumption—that is, group error decreases as diversity decreases ceteris paribus, holding
constant individual accuracy. However, the effect of a change in diversity measured as variance
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(in equation 2) or correlation (in equation 4) depends critically on the concurrent change in
individual accuracy. Importantly, social processes that decrease diversity can also paradoxically
increase average individual accuracy. As an extreme but illustrative example, suppose that every
individual after deliberation adopts the average of the group’s initial, independent belief distribution.
By virtue of equation 2, average individual error will necessarily decrease—because individual error
will become equal to group error. Thus, in order to fully understand the effect of social influence
on group accuracy, it is necessary to consider change in both diversity and individual error.
One key formalization that provides a general framework for studying the effect of social
influence is network theory. Although not all belief formation processes take place over an explicitly
defined social network, a network model can often still be used to describe the effect of social
influence. For example, in a committee discussion it is frequently the case that everyone observes
everyone else, thus obviating the need for a network model to describe patterns of information flow.
However, despite the unstructured communication, it may nonetheless be the case that some
members are more influential on other members, and the resulting belief distributions can be
calculated using an adjacency matrix representing the weighted, directed network of influence
(DeGroot, 1974).
If a scholar simply asks, “is social influence helpful or harmful?” then they may find apparent
controversy within research on the wisdom of crowds. However, evidence from theoretical models
(Becker et al., 2017; Golub & Jackson, 2010; Mossel & Tamuz, 2017), observational case studies
(Janis, 1982), and experimental tests (Becker et al., 2017) can all be brought into alignment by
reference to social network theory.

Evidence consistently indicates that social information

processing can improve beliefs in “egalitarian” (Mossel, Sly, & Tamuz, 2015) or “decentralized”
(Becker et al., 2017) networks, which are defined as networks in which every individual is equally
influential. The ability for social influence to either improve or undermine belief accuracy can be
illustrated by a comparison of centralized networks to decentralized networks.

In a highly

centralized social influence network, one or a small number of people are highly influential and
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everyone else is relatively uninfluential, either due to the structure of information exchange (the
influential group is more widely observed) or the structure of influence (e.g., the influential group is
more persuasive). As a result, the effective source of information shaping group beliefs is a small
group rather than a large group. Since not everyone’s opinion contributes, the resulting collective
belief represents the wisdom of the few and not the wisdom of the crowd: the group does not use
of all the information held by its members. In a decentralized network, where everyone is by
definition equally influential, then the collective belief represents the combined opinion of all
members. Thus network structure can determine whether social influence improves or undermines
group accuracy (Becker et al., 2017).

Herding and Groupthink. The diversity prediction theorem is not the only source of concern
regarding the potential risks of social influence, and such concerns are further motivated by the
social psychological concept of “groupthink” (Janis, 1982). In developing the theory of groupthink,
Janis conducted a series of case studies on decision-making in organizations, attempting to identify
principles that might lead groups of otherwise intelligent people to make disastrous decisions. One
potential problem they identified is pressure for group cohesion, which can lead individuals to
suppress novel information if it appears to disagree with previously established group beliefs.
Another risk is caused by “directive leadership,” where a single individual directs group beliefs at
the expense of information held by individual members. Although these mechanisms are quite
different than the principle of statistical independence, they nonetheless highlight the importance
of informational diversity—groups only make fully informed decisions if they use all the available
information.
Formal models of herding also show how social influence can lead to widespread
inaccuracy in a population. Banerjee (1992) developed a simple model in which each person has
both a private signal (which differs for each individual) and a public signal (shared for each
individual) about two different choices, and must determine which choice provides a higher payoff
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(thus, a binary classification problem). The key property of this model is that individuals make
sequential decisions, and each individual observes the decision made by individuals earlier in the
sequence. In a population where one person has an incorrect private signal, and all the other
people have correct signals, the entire population will be led astray if the one person with the
incorrect signal is the first person to make a decision—even when each person is acting rationally
according to Bayesian principles (Banerjee, 1992). Because that first person informs the second
person, who then makes an incorrect decision, this initiates an informational cascade
(Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & Welch, 1992) that leads the entire population to make an incorrect
decision, even if most individuals would make the correct decision independently. Like Janis’
research on Groupthink (1982), however, the dangers of herding are also consistent with the
expected benefits of decentralized networks: in a sequential interaction, the first person is more
influential than the rest of the population.

The Delphi Method. Given the potential risks of social influence, an important area of research has
been the identification of methods that allow groups to actively process information while avoiding
herding and Groupthink. One early approach was termed the “Delphi” method (an homage to the
Oracle of Delphi), a process which emerged out of military research designed to allow panels of
experts to generate unbiased forecasts (Dalkey & Helmer, 1963). The method is simple: estimates
are first obtained from experts by way of interview or written questionnaire; each expert’s belief is
then shared with the other experts via a mediator or written information exchange, thus avoiding
the risks associated with direct interpersonal communication (such as normative pressures); and
each expert is then asked to provide a revised belief.
In general, the Delphi method has provided more accurate estimates than independent
individuals, but research on this process has produced inconsistent results (for a review, see Rowe
& Wright, 1999).

This inconsistency can be traced to methodological limitations leading to

ambiguity on two crucial points. First, the precise method by which information was exchanged
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varied across studies. It is thus difficult to know why many but not all studies found that the Delphi
method improved accuracy, or to determine what method of information exchange was most
effective. Second, these studies frequently lacked sufficient experimental control, limiting causal
inference.

When comparing “staticized” or “nominal” groups (i.e., groups of independent

individuals) with interacting groups, it was common practice for staticized groups to answer the
question only once, while interacting groups had the opportunity to reconsider and revise their
beliefs (see, e.g., Gustafson, Shukla, Delbecq, & Walster, 1973). Thus it is impossible to determine
from these studies whether the improved accuracy resulted from truly social learning effects or
whether they can be explained by individual learning effects. Contemporary research, however,
has begun to combine formal models of social influence with carefully controlled experiments to
provide a more thorough understanding of the effect of social influence on the wisdom of crowds.

Numeric Estimates in Networks. A core feature of Banerjee’s herding model is that individuals
make decisions once, sequentially. In contrast, DeGroot (1974) studies a simple model of opinion
formation in which each individual begins with an independently generated belief, and then revises
their belief by combining their own initial belief with the beliefs of some subset of the population.
This subset can either represent the set of individuals who are observable to them (as in a sparse
communication network) or, alternatively, the set of peers who are influential (i.e., a person may
observe everybody in the population, but be influenced only by a subset). DeGroot showed that
under very general conditions, a group following this process indefinitely will asymptotically
converge on a single, shared belief which is a weighted mean of the group’s initial, independent
belief distribution. The weight that each person contributes is determined by their eigenvector
centrality in the network adjacency matrix.

Although DeGroot was not studying accuracy

specifically, this model is readily adapted to examine the effect of social influence on the wisdom
of crowds (Becker et al., 2017; Golub & Jackson, 2010).
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Under the assumption that the sum of each person’s outgoing ties (i.e., the total influence
a person has on others) is identical, then each individual is equally central and thus contributes
equally to the final group mean. Under such circumstances, the group will converge on the mean
of independent beliefs, and the mean itself will not be changed by social influence. Thus if
individuals in a population are all equally influential, social influence will improve average individual
accuracy without undermining the wisdom of crowds—since the initial group error is necessarily
less than or equal to initial average individual error, and they become equivalent asymptotically.
This prediction is supported by the results of several experimental studies, including a reanalysis
by Farrell (2011) of the data provided by Lorenz et al (2011), and several other studies (Becker et
al., 2017; Becker & Centola, 2018; Gürçay, Mellers, & Baron, 2015).
The prediction that decentralized networks converge toward the mean assumes that
individuals all respond equally to social influence, or that the response to social influence is
distributed identically throughout a population (Becker et al, 2017). However, in another reanalysis
of the experimental data produced by Lorenz et al (2011), Madirolas & de Polavieja (2015) found
that individuals who hold beliefs closer to the truth also revise their answers less in response to
social information, and thus the response to social information is correlated with beliefs. This
finding is consistent with the observation by Koriat (2012) and Prelec et al (2017) that individuals
who express greater confidence in their beliefs are also, on average, more accurate.

This

psychological tendency has collective implications. Becker et al (2017) note that individuals who
place greater weight on their own belief are more central weighted network of social influence,
since the diagonal of the adjacency matrix contributes to centrality—the diagonal indicates network
“self-ties” and represents the influence of a person’s initial belief on their revised belief. In both
simulation and experiment, Becker et al. find that when populations are embedded in networks
where everybody has an equal number of ties, the mean belief improves as it is drawn towards the
belief of more accurate individuals.
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Binary Beliefs in Networks. While research on the collected wisdom of crowds has examined both
classification tasks (Koriat, 2012; Kurvers et al., 2016; Prelec et al., 2017) and numeric estimates
(Galton, 1907; Klugman, 1947; Nofer & Hinz, 2014), research on social influence has largely
focused on numeric estimates. Network models of categorical belief formation have not received
the theoretical attention of the DeGroot model, but available research suggests that social influence
has fundamentally different effects on categorical beliefs than on numeric estimates.
One popular model known as the “voter” model (Castellano, Fortunato, & Loreto, 2009)
assumes that individuals can hold one of two beliefs, and that people update their beliefs
asynchronously. With each update, a voter randomly selects a neighbor and adopts their opinion.
One variation of this model assumes that each individual adopts the behavior of the majority of their
peers. In both of these cases, as one might expect from symmetry, the consensus belief of the
population is determined by the initial distribution of beliefs. As a result, consensus (if it emerges)
is likely to reflect the initial majority (Castellano et al., 2009; Mossel & Tamuz, 2017). In this respect,
models of binary beliefs are comparable to the DeGroot model, which predicts that groups in
decentralized networks will converge on the mean of independent beliefs. However, as noted
above, people sharing numeric estimates do not all respond equally to social information (Becker
et al., 2017; Madirolas & de Polavieja, 2015). As also noted above, for binary beliefs the correlation
between accuracy and confidence appears to hold only when the majority is already correct. Thus
while inaccurate numeric beliefs appear to self-correct in a population, inaccurate binary beliefs
may in fact become more pronounced.
In the course of developing this article, we have been unable to find any experimental tests
or theoretical models (besides the voter model and its variants) studying the effect of social
influence on the accuracy of binary beliefs in groups in simple information exchange. By simple
information exchange, we mean a scenario in which: individuals first form some estimate based on
a signal about the state of the world (i.e., available information), then learn about the estimates of
others, and then revise their estimates (as in, e.g., the Delphi method). This process of simple
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information exchange is important because it reflects group processes in which a people discuss
available information with negligible introduction of new information. While microeconomic models
of social learning (Acemoglu & Ozdaglar, 2011; Golub & Sadler, 2017) have been extensively
studied to understand binary belief formation in networks (Bala & Goyal, 1998; Banerjee, 1992;
Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Krafft et al., 2016; Mossel, Sly, & Tamuz, 2015), these social learning
models typically assume that individual decisions are accompanied by behavior which leads to new
information being revealed.

Conditions of Information Exchange. While Janis’ theory of Groupthink was developed based on
observational studies of deliberation and information exchange in all its empirical richness, the
theories and experimental studies discussed above assume that opinions and communication are
limited to simple, unidimensional numeric beliefs. These studies provide compelling evidence to
indicate that social influence can improve the accuracy of group beliefs as long as information
exchange occurs in a controlled fashion.

An important question to ask is what method of

information exchange produces the greatest increase in group accuracy.
To address this question, Gustafson et al. (1973) compared information exchange via
written feedback with information exchange via group discussion. Surprisingly, they found that they
found that written feedback offered no improvement over independent estimates, while verbal
discussion generated a significant increase in accuracy as compared with independent estimates.
The finding that written feedback offered no accuracy benefit contradicts the more recent finding
that written feedback improves estimate accuracy (Becker & Centola, 2018, 2018; Farrell, 2011;
Gürçay et al., 2015). One explanation for this discrepancy is that Gustafson et al’s null result is
due to insufficient statistical power (Becker et al., 2017). Another possibility is that variation in the
conditions under which information exchange takes place can moderate the effect of social
influence on belief accuracy, which would explain both why verbal feedback was beneficial (in
contrast with with Janis’ [1982] observations of Groupthink) and also why written feedback did not
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improve estimate accuracy. The potential for verbal deliberation to improve estimate accuracy
under controlled conditions has been echoed by Navajas et al. (2018) who found that small
deliberating groups produced estimates more accurate than large independent groups, although
they did not compare deliberating groups with groups exchanging written information. Navajas et
al. also surveyed respondents after they provided their revised estimates, and found that providing
explicit arguments to justify their beliefs was an important component of discussion, suggesting
that verbal exchange allows people to share information that cannot be carried through numeric
reports alone.
Taken together, these numerous experiments and case studies provide strong evidence
that information exchange between group members can allow groups to actively process the
information held by their members, but also that information exchange will not always lead to
accuracy improvements. Given the currently inconsistent findings on the relative benefits of
numeric feedback versus verbal discussion, an important area for future research will be identifying
which forms of social influence allow groups to maximize the benefits of information exchange in
order to generate accurate collective beliefs.

Relationship to Other Forms Collective Intelligence
This article has focused on the accuracy of group beliefs, reflecting the vast majority of research
on the wisdom of crowds. However, the term “wisdom of crowds” has occasionally been applied
more broadly to a range of collective processes such as crowdsourcing (Celis, Krafft, & Kobe, 2016;
Kittur & Kraut, 2008; Shi, Teplitskiy, Duede, & Evans, 2017). While these processes fall under the
broad umbrella term of “collective intelligence” (Malone & Bernstein, 2015; Woolley, Chabris,
Pentland, Hashmi, & Malone, 2010), collective belief formation can be distinguished from other
collective processes along a few key dimensions. The first dimension, as discussed above in
reference to social learning, is whether or not the group is simply aggregating and processing
available information, as in the wisdom of crowds, or whether social dynamics impact information
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collection as well, as in microeconomic theories of social learning. Another dimension of analysis
is the outcome of interest. In collective problem solving, for example, outcomes are measured by
an objective payoff function that cannot be reduced to accuracy. A third dimension is the social
nature of the task, as in coordination behavior, which is inherently social and does not reflect a task
that can be done by independent individuals. While these dimensions are not intended to be
exhaustive, they serve to further define the idea of the wisdom of crowds by providing contrast
against these other types of collective intelligence processes.

Problem Solving. A related problem in collective intelligence is the ability for groups to identify
solutions to problems. Early research on problem solving focused on brainstorming, which is a
process in which individuals collectively list as many ideas as possible to solve a particular problem
(Stroebe, Nijstad, & Rietzschel, 2010). As with research on the wisdom of crowds, research on
problem solving has been characterized by an emphasis on the role of social influence. Research
on brainstorming has identified some conditions under which social influence inhibits idea
generation, and some conditions under which interacting groups can produce more ideas than
equivalently sized groups of independent individuals. While brainstorming research focuses only
on the number of ideas generated, Lazer & Friedman ( 2007) model group problem solving with an
emphasis on the quality of the ideas generated.

They formally model problem solving as

exploration in “NK Space” (Kauffman, 1993) which characterizes a multidimensional search for
solutions to any particular problem and can be parameterized to represent simple or complex
problems. Where group accuracy depends chiefly on the centralization of information exchange
networks (Becker et al. 2017), problem solving depends primarily on the structural efficiency of
information exchange networks, with the counterintuitive finding that increased efficiency leads to
herding on suboptimal solutions (Lazer & Friedman, 2007). This type of model can be applied to
many crowd-sourcing problems, such as FoldIt and GalaxyZoo (Khatib et al., 2011). Wikipedia, a
prominent crowd-sourcing platform, has occasionally been described as a “wisdom of crowds”
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phenomenon (Kittur & Kraut, 2008; Niederer & Van Dijck, 2010; Shi et al., 2017) but is better
described in terms of brainstorming and problem solving.
Using Lazer & Friedman’s (2007) model, problem solving can be formally distinguished
from belief formation in two ways. One distinction is the ability for estimating groups to produce
optimal (accurate) outcomes by averaging two suboptimal (inaccurate) estimates, a fundamental
principle of the wisdom of crowds. No such concept exists for problem solving: there is no sense
in which “errors cancel out,” and two suboptimal solutions cannot be combined with any guarantee
of forming an optimal solution. Second is the effect of increasing group sizes. As the number of
individuals contributing to a crowd-sourced estimate increases, the group average will converge on
the expected bias as measured in Equation 1, with a diminishing marginal return: an infinitely large
group will not yield a perfectly accurate answer. In contrast, increasing the size of problem solving
groups will increase indefinitely the likelihood of hitting upon the optimal solution. As the number
of individuals in Lazer & Friedman’s model increases, the probability that the optimal solution is
found approaches certainty.

Coordination. Another important process in collective intelligence is coordination behavior (Lewis,
1969), which drives social processes such as language conventions (Centola & Baronchelli, 2015)
and resource usage (Hardin, 1968). In one classic problem, people must decide whether or not to
go to a popular bar (Casti, 1996). If too many people attend the bar, it is too crowded to be fun; if
too few people attend, there are not enough peers to sustain a party. One fundamental coordination
problem is represented by pure coordination games, which are a widely studied game theoretic
model used to characterize social and technological conventions.

Pure coordination games

capture behaviors with positive externalities—i.e., where the payoff to a behavior increases
monotonically as other people adopt the solution (Young, 1993).

Examples include language

conventions, in which a word is only useful if it can be understood, and social media platforms,
which only hold value if other people use them. Theoretical models have argued that, like problem
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solving and estimation tasks, the probability of optimal coordination depends on network structure.
However, the factors that promote optimal coordination differ from the factors that promote optimal
belief accuracy or solution generation. While evolutionary models initially argued that the best
solution will spread in infinite time (Blume, 1993; Kandori, Mailath, & Rob, 1993; Young, 1993),
subsequent analyses found that only sparse, highly clustered networks favored the ability for
optimal solutions to spread (Ellison, 1993, 2000; Montanari & Saberi, 2010).

In contrast,

populations can remain stuck in suboptimal equilibria for long periods of time in highly dense or
random networks.
While the empirical and theoretical characteristics of crowd estimates and coordination
problems differ on many dimensions, one of the most fundamental differences lies in the payoff
structure. In belief formation, the accuracy of any individual’s estimate is independent from the
behavior of other group members. For coordination behavior, not only is the payoff of a strategy
dependent on the behavior of other group members, but the process itself is fundamentally
undefined for an individual acting in isolation.

Conclusion
The defining characteristic of research on the wisdom of crowds as compared with other models of
collective intelligence is an interest in the accuracy of group beliefs given some information set. In
network models of belief formation, the assumption of fixed private signals distinguishes the
wisdom of crowds from microeconomic models of social learning, in which belief updating involves
the continual observation of new information. The focus on accuracy distinguishes the wisdom of
crowds from models of coordination and collective problem solving, in which beliefs are assumed
to be accurate, with other features of social influence forming the locus of attention. However, even
as the wisdom of crowds is a distinct phenomenon that can be studied in isolation from other
collective intelligence processes, collective belief formation is also a fundamental process that
underlies many different behaviors and decisions. When solving complex problems or making
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coordination decisions, for example, individuals within groups must form accurate beliefs about the
payoff of different strategies under consideration. One important area for future research on the
wisdom of crowds and collective intelligence more broadly is to understand how these different
process interact to form decisions that may require estimation, coordination, and problem solving
simultaneously.
With regard to belief accuracy and the wisdom of crowds in particular, the two research
paradigms described in this review each reflect distinct methodological and theoretical perspectives
as well as distinct practical goals. Research on the aggregation of independent beliefs is distinct
in that it adopts a machine learning perspective and is commonly aimed at allowing outside parties
to aggregate individual beliefs to produce crowd sourced estimates. In contrast, research on
collective belief formation is less focused on the optimization of crowdsourced estimates, and
instead seeks to understand the endogenous processes through which organizations and societies
can process information without the assistance of a centralized aggregation mechanism. While
this process itself can be harnessed to generate accurate estimates for an external decision-maker,
it also provides cautious but optimistic guidelines to promote optimal collective intelligence in
groups.
Despite the growing popularity of research on the wisdom of crowds, many processes of
collective belief formation remain unexplored, including both the difference between various forms
of communication and also the effect of social influence on binary belief formation. Nonetheless,
a large body of research points consistently to one common factor in the formation of accurate
group beliefs: informational diversity.

From the diversity prediction theorem to decentralized

network structures, research on the wisdom of crowds has found that collective beliefs will be most
accurate when groups take full advantage of all the information held by each individual member.
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CHAPTER 2: NETWORK DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE IN THE WISDOM OF CROWDS
Abstract
Since Galton’s discovery of the “wisdom of crowds” theories of collective intelligence have
suggested that in order for a group to be accurate, individuals within the group must be either
independent, with uncorrelated beliefs, or diverse, with negatively correlated beliefs. Previous
experimental studies argued that social influence undermines the wisdom of crowds, showing that
individual estimates became more similar when subjects observed each other’s beliefs, reducing
diversity without a corresponding increase in group accuracy. In contrast, we find general network
conditions under which social influence can improve group estimates, even as individual opinions
become more similar. We present theoretical predictions and large scale experimental results
showing that in decentralized communication networks, group estimates become more accurate
as a result of exposure to social information. We also present results showing that in centralized
networks, the influence of central individuals dominates the collective estimation process, and
group estimates are as likely to increase in error as they are to become more accurate.

Introduction
Research on crowdsourcing (Sunstein, 2006), prediction markets (Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004), and
financial forecasting (Nofer & Hinz, 2014) has found that the aggregated judgements of many
individuals can be more accurate than the judgements of individual experts. This phenomenon,
known as the “wisdom of crowds” (Surowiecki, 2004) has been observed to occur in areas ranging
from medical decisions (Kurvers et al., 2016; Wolf et al., 2015) and geopolitical predictions (Mellers
et al., 2014; Sjöberg, 2009) to sports betting (Herzog & Hertwig, 2009). However, harnessing the
wisdom of crowds remains a challenge: previous theorists have argued that group estimates can
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be accurate only as long as individuals within the group do not communicate (Surowiecki, 2004;
Lorenz et al, 2011).
Statistical explanations for the wisdom of crowd suggest that group estimations will be
accurate as long as individuals within the group contribute estimates that are sufficiently diverse,
so that individual errors cancel out leaving an accurate group estimate. To illustrate this point,
Page (2007) developed the “diversity prediction theory,” which states the following:

where B is the vector of estimates by N individuals; c is the collective estimate, defined as the group
mean 𝐵̅ ; and θ is the true value. The first term in the equation, on the left, represents the squared
error of the crowd estimate; the second term in the equation represents the average squared error
of individuals; and the third term in the equation represents diversity, which takes a form nearly
identical to the common formula for statistical variance.
This mathematical identity (identical in form to the standard partitioning for the sum of
squares in any predictive model) highlights two important points. First, the diversity prediction
theorem shows that the error of the group mean is guaranteed to be smaller than the average error
of individual estimates. This equation does not require that the group mean will always be more
accurate than any individual estimate, but it does establish minimum expectations for the accuracy
of crowd estimates.

Second, the diversity prediction theorem shows that diversity, which is

comparable to statistical variance, is a crucial component of crowd wisdom. In situations where
every individual is accurate (low average error), there will be low diversity but high collective
accuracy, because individuals hold similar beliefs, and those beliefs are true.

However, in

situations where individuals tend to be very inaccurate – precisely those scenarios in which
collective wisdom is most beneficial – the collective estimate will only be accurate if diversity is very
high.
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Social Influence and the Wisdom of Crowds
One major risk faced by decision-making bodies stems from the individual tendency toward
conformity (Janis, 1972; Surowiecki, 2004; Sunstein, 2006).

In perhaps the most famous

experimental study of conformity, Asch (1951) demonstrated that subjects were willing to provide
an obviously false response on a question of factual accuracy after being able to observe that
everyone else in the study disagreed with their initial belief. The observation that people will adjust
their beliefs to become more similar to social referents has been replicated in a number of studies
with a range of experimental designs, using both discrete choice and continuous response tasks
(Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Jenness, 1932; Lorenz et al., 2011; Myers & Bishop, 1971; Sherif, 1935).
The tendency toward conformity presents a challenge for organizations and other groups
that want to take advantage of the wisdom of crowds. In his pioneering set of case studies on
group decision-making, Janis (1972) identified “Groupthink” as the cause behind some of the most
catastrophic group decisions in history, such as the infamously botched Bay of Pigs invasion. While
the process of Groupthink is characterized by several mechanisms, they all are driven by a need
for group cohesion. In particular, the pressure towards conformity serves to reduce the diversity of
information available within a group. This emerges not only from the conformity effects described
above, where individuals over time gradually hold increasingly similar beliefs, but also due to a
tendency for group norms to suppress the introduction of new information which appears to deviate
from the beliefs of the group as a whole.
The case studies described by Janis (1972) and Surowiecki (2004) demonstrate that
conformity can lead groups to neglect the diversity of information contained within their members,
but this anecdotal evidence is not sufficient to support a general claim that the wisdom of crowds
can only emerge when individuals are independent (Surowiecki, 2004).

To develop a more

comprehensive theory of communication and collective intelligence, it is necessary to distinguish
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between two forms of social influence: normative influence and informational influence (Deutsch
& Gerard, 1955).
Normative influence is driven by the goal of conformity for conformity’s sake (e.g., to avoid
sanction) and is marked by an outward compliance toward group beliefs, but does not necessarily
entail a change in private beliefs (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). While outward compliance can
ultimately engender a change in a person’s true belief, due to the need for cognitive consistency
(Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959) or the dynamics of self-perception (Bem, 1967) these cognitive
processes are quite distinct from the effects of informational influence. While normative influence
shapes outward conformity through a desire for group cohesion, informational influence directly
shapes a person’s true beliefs. This occurs because the beliefs and behaviors of peer referents
may be rationally interpreted as a valid signal indicating the best decision.

In the case of

judgements where there is a true answer, people recognize their own potential for error, and so
descriptive social norms – that is, beliefs about what other people believe – offer real informational
value, because of their perceived potential to improve accuracy (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004).
Experimental evidence suggests that both normative and informational influence lead to
decreased diversity of beliefs within a group. In a replication of the original Asch (1951) conformity
study, Deutsch and Gerard (1955) compared the effects of social influence under two different
conditions. In the “normative influence” condition, subjects exchanged information about beliefs
while being able to see each other; in the “informational influence” condition, subjects exchanged
information anonymously. Deutsch and Gerard found that both conditions induced conformity on
beliefs, but that anonymous interaction produced significantly weaker effects. These results open
the door for the possibility that the dangers posed to collective decisions may be limited to the
context of normative pressure, and may not appear when social influence is limited to informational
influence.
Despite the potential for loss of diversity, Gustafson et al (1973), offers suggestive
evidence that social influence can improve the accuracy of group estimates when interactions are
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limited to information exchange. Remarkably, this experiment showed that estimates generated
after group discussion were actually more accurate than estimates by independent individuals!
However, because independent individuals submitted only one estimate, while the groups
completed the task multiple times, it is not possible to determine whether their results were truly
due the effect of social influence, or simply the result of individual learning. Moreover, the groups
were very small, and without a clear mechanism, it is difficult to generalize these results to large
networks.
In the most comprehensive study to date, Lorenz et al (2011) conducted an experiment in
which groups of 12 individuals each completed a series of estimation tasks on matters of factual
accuracy. In each task, the subjects were asked to provide an initial response and then revise their
answer several times. In set of trials, they observed the beliefs of other subjects between revisions.
In a control condition, the subjects revised their beliefs several times, but were not exposed to
social information. With this design, Lorenz et al were able to directly assess the effect of
informational influence on the accuracy of the mean estimate within a group, while controlling for
the effect of individual learning.
In contrast with Gustafson et al (1973), Lorenz et al (2011) found no evidence that social
influence improved the accuracy of collective estimates. However, they observed that informational
influence reduces the diversity of estimates within a group. The authors argued on this basis that
social influence undermines the wisdom of crowds through the range reduction effect, in which a
greater number of individual beliefs is required to bracket the true answer; and the “social influence
effect” which refers to "the fact that social influence diminishes diversity in groups without improving
its accuracy” (p.9022).
Lorenz et al argue that social influence decreases diversity, but that diversity is required
for the wisdom of crowds to be effective, and thus social influence undermines the wisdom of
crowds. However, a careful consideration of the diversity prediction theorem suggests that social
influence nonetheless can improve the wisdom of crowds. First, the diversity prediction theorem
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indicates that individuals may become more accurate. In order for group diversity to decrease, one
of the other two terms in the equation must change – either collective error or average individual
error.

If group accuracy does not change, then average individual error must decrease.

A

subsequent re-analysis of the publicly available data from the Lorenz et al (2011) study confirms
this hypothesis, that individual error did in fact decrease (Farrell, 2011) a finding which has since
been replicated by other researchers (Gürçay et al., 2015).
However, the finding by Farrell (2011) still leaves the effect of social influence on collective
accuracy undetermined. Depending on how much individual error was reduced in comparison with
the decrease in diversity, it remains possible that the collective error either increased, decreased,
or remained unchanged.
To address this question, we build on a formal model of social influence (DeGroot, 1974)
to test the effect of informational influence on collective accuracy.

Under the most general

assumptions, group beliefs are expected to converge on the group mean. As a result of the skewed
as distributions observed in previous studies (Galton, 1907; Lorenz et al, 2011) this model predicts
that median estimate should become more accurate as the group converges toward the mean of
independent estimates.

By calibrating this model with publicly available data from previous

experiments, we find that the results reported by Lorenz et al did indicate Type II error, due to
insufficient statistical power (see Appendix figure A7).
In addition to predicting that the median estimate will improve under the most general
assumptions, this model also predicts that group mean itself will become more accurate as a result
of informational influence. In research on the aggregation of estimates by independent individuals,
self-reported confidence has been shown to correlate with accuracy (Koriat, 2012). At the same
time, individuals participating in group decisions are expected to exhibit a “self-weighting” effect,
such that their contribution to collective decisions is moderated by self-perceptions regarding their
own expertise (Gustafson et al, 1973). If self-weight is correlated with accuracy, then social
influence can produce a reliable increase in the accuracy of collective estimates.
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Formal Model of Social Influence
To study the effect of social influence on the wisdom of crowds, we adopt DeGroot’s (1974) model
of belief formation.

In this model, each person i in a group of N people begins with some

independent initial estimate, B0,i. After observing the estimates of others, people revise their belief
by taking a weighted average of their own initial belief and the beliefs of others in the social network.
DeGroot studies the formation of collective beliefs in a weighted, directed influence network, where
entries in the network adjacency matrix indicate both whether i observes j, as well as the strength
of influence that j has on i’s belief. DeGroot showed that when groups revise their beliefs repeated
indefinitely, they will asymptotically converge on a weighted mean of the initial independent beliefs.
Each person’s independent belief contributes a weight equivalent to their eigenvector centrality in
the weighted, directed influence network.

This result indicates that individuals can be more

influential by being more central in the communication network as a whole, as well as by being
more influential on those in their immediate ego network.
To study the effect of network topology independently from the effect of variation in
individual persuasiveness, we define the effect of social influence on a binary, undirected
communication network. To isolate the effects of informational influence, we assume that subjects
place equal weight on all of the beliefs they are able to observe. Thus, each individual’s revision
can be expressed as a weighted sum of their own estimate and the average estimates of network
neighbors:

Bt 1,i   i  Bt ,i  (1   i )  B t , jN i
where

Bt ,i indicates the response of subject i at time t; αi indicates the self-weight a subject places

on their own initial estimate; (1 - αi) indicates the weight they place on the average estimate of their
network neighbors; and

B t , jN i indicates the average estimate of subject i’s network neighbors at
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time t.

The group revision process is fully determined by three parameters: the vector of initial

beliefs B; the vector of self-weight, α; and a binary adjacency matrix A, which defines who can
observe whom in the communication network.

Theoretical Predictions
The results obtained by DeGroot (1974) indicate that if everyone is equally central in the influence
network, than a group will converge on the arithmetic mean of initial, independent beliefs. This
“decentralization” (Freeman, 1978) can be achieved when individuals are all equally connected in
the communication network and also equally influential on their immediate peers. We find that
convergence towards the mean holds more generally under the assumption that self-weight (α) is
independently, identically distributed (i.i.d.) throughout the population. In previous studies, the
distribution of independent estimates was found to demonstrate a skew such that median belief not
only underestimated the true value, but was also lower than the mean belief.

As a result,

convergence toward the mean has the effect of improving the accuracy of the median estimate.
Thus, one possibility is that self-weight is distributed i.i.d., and groups thus converge
towards the mean, improving both individual estimates (Farrel, 2011; Gurcay et al, 2015) as well
as the median estimate, an important indicator of the wisdom of crowds (Galton, 1907). However,
if self-weight is not distributed i.i.d., then individuals who systematically place more weight on their
own belief will also have a stronger influence on collective belief. The importance of self-weight is
due to the fact that each individual’s eigenvector centrality in the influence network is determined
in part by self-weight, which is represented as a “self-tie” in the weighted influence network. People
who weight themselves more highly will, correspondingly, give less weight to social information,
thus decreasing the centrality of their peers and making themselves more central in the weighted
social influence network.
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Previous studies have observed a correlation between self-reported confidence and
accuracy (Koriat, 2012). One important possibility, then, is that self-weight is not i.i.d., but is instead
correlated with belief. The model described above predicts that when error and self-weight are
negatively correlated (so that people with more error have less self-weight), social influence in
decentralized networks will increase group accuracy.
While beliefs in decentralized networks may thus be shaped by heterogeneity in the
individual response to social information, group beliefs in centralized networks are overwhelmingly
determined by the beliefs of those individuals most central in the communication network. Even
when accuracy is correlated with self-weight, highly centralized networks only improve when the
central individuals hold a belief that pulls the group toward truth.

Experimental Design
We recruited 1,360 participants from the World Wide Web to take part in a series of estimation
challenges. Subjects were randomized either to one of two experimental social network conditions,
or to a control condition. In all conditions, participants were prompted to complete estimation tasks
and were awarded a monetary prize based on the accuracy of their final estimate. In the network
conditions, participants were placed into either a decentralized network, in which everyone had
equal connectivity, or a centralized network, in which a highly connected central member had a
disproportionate number of connections.
Each social network contained 40 subjects.

Within each network, all subjects were

simultaneously shown the same image prompt (e.g., a plate of food) and asked to estimate a
numerical quantity (e.g., the caloric content). There were three rounds for each estimation task. In
Round One, participants provided an independent estimate based on the prompt. In both network
conditions, participants were then shown the average estimate of the peers directly connected to
them in their social network, and prompted to submit their answers again in Round Two. Subjects
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were then shown the average of their peers’ revised estimates, and prompted to submit a final
estimate in Round Three. Thus, for each question, participants provided one independent estimate
and two estimates after exposure to social information, for a total of three estimates per question.
Subjects were not provided with any information about their social networks, which ensured that
the subject experience was identical across the two network conditions.
Subjects who were randomized to the control condition were not placed into social
networks, but were instead given the opportunity to answer the same questions without being
exposed to social influence. These participants were still given the opportunity to revise their initial
answer two times, providing a total of three independent estimates per question. All control
participants observed the same sets of questions in the same order as participants embedded
within the experimental networks. More generally, the subject experience in the control condition
was identical to that of subjects in other conditions, except that participants were not given any
social information.
Each experimental trial of the study consisted of an identical set of questions provided to
one decentralized network (40 individuals) and one centralized network (40 individuals). For each
set of questions that was asked in the experimental trials, we also collected responses from 40
independent individuals in the control condition, who collectively formed a “control group” for that
set of questions. Each subject participated only once in our study—either in one network condition
or in one control group—such that every network condition and control group was comprised of a
unique set of 40 individuals.
Because subjects in the network conditions were not statistically independent, all analyses
of collective estimates in the network conditions were conducted at the group level. Additionally,
because each network completed multiple estimation tasks within an experimental trial, we cluster
our main analysis at the trial level such that each network provides a single, independent
observation. In total, we conducted 13 experimental trials, comprising 520 subjects in each network
condition (1,040 experimental subjects in total). In 6 of the experimental trials, subjects answered

37

4 questions in each trial, where each question set was unique. In the remaining 7 trials, subjects
answered 5 questions in each trial, using 2 unique questions over repeated trials. In total, this
produced 8 unique question sets.
Control groups were conducted corresponding to each unique question set, producing 8
control groups, each of size 40 (320 control subjects in total). Because subjects in the control
groups were independent from each other, fewer overall subjects were required for the control
analyses. Nevertheless, for proper comparison with the experimental conditions, we still conducted
our control trials with subjects in groups of 40, and conduct our analyses at the group level.

Estimation Tasks. To ensure that our findings are robust to variations in the distribution of
estimates, we conducted two sets of experimental trials, using questions that generate distributions
with different shapes. In six of the thirteen trials, subjects were given count-based questions (e.g.,
“how many candies are in this jar?”). Because these are zero-bounded on the left and unbounded
on the right, count-based questions generate highly skewed distributions (Lorenz et al, 2011), in
which the median is expected to improve even if the mean remains unchanged. In the remaining
trials, we asked participants to provide responses to percentage based question (e.g., “what
percentage of people in this photograph are wearing hats”). These responses are constrained to
fall between zero and one hundred, and did not produce any systematic skew in the distribution of
estimates. For a detailed description of the estimation tasks, see Appendix B.

Experimental Analysis. We measure the cumulative effect of social influence on collective
judgments by comparing the initial estimates of each group (i.e., in Round One of our study), with
the final estimates of each group after two rounds of revision (i.e., in Round Three). For our main
experimental outcomes, cluster-robust estimates are generated by testing differences in the
average error and average change in error across all estimation tasks completed by each group.
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For analyses where we examine correlations across each separate estimation task completed by
each group, we obtain cluster-robust estimates by using cluster-robust error and adding a groupsspecific intercept to the regression model.
For results where we report percent change, all comparisons are made between final
estimates (i.e., Round Three) and independent estimates (i.e., Round One), so that percent change
is measured as the magnitude of the change in the estimate divided by the magnitude of the initial
estimate. To facilitate comparisons across different estimation tasks of different scales (i.e., some
questions have true answers over 1000, while some questions have true answers under 100) we
normalize all estimates, dividing them by the standard deviation of the independent responses for
each question. All reported changes in error are therefore measured in terms of the distance of
each estimate from the truth, represented as the number of standard deviations (s.d.) away from
the true answer (comparable to a z-score).

Results
Social network structure significantly affected the wisdom of crowds.

We found both that

decentralized networks showed the predicted increase in collective accuracy, and that centralized
networks exhibited the predicted bias toward the beliefs of central individuals. We begin our
analysis by confirming that in the independent round (i.e., Round One of all trials) groups exhibited
the wisdom of crowds. Consistent with earlier studies (1,6-9,14), we found that, on average, both
the mean and the median of each group’s estimate was more accurate than the majority of its
members. In the results that follow, we analyze how social influence affected the trajectory of group
estimates in each of the network conditions.

Social Influence in Decentralized Networks. Social influence dramatically reduced the diversity of
group estimates. As shown in Figure 1D, two rounds of revision significantly narrowed the standard
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deviation of responses (N=13 trials, P<0.001, Wilcoxon signed rank test), producing a 43%
reduction in the average standard deviation between Round One and Round Three. This sizable
reduction in diversity replicates the main finding from previous experimental research on social
influence in the wisdom of crowds (14).
However, this reduction in diversity did not undermine the wisdom of crowds. Rather,
consistent with previous research (29,30), we found that social influence in decentralized networks
produced significant improvements in individual accuracy. Across all 13 trials with decentralized
networks, average individual error was significantly lower in Round Three than it was in Round
One, decreasing by 23% on average (N=13 trials, P<0.001, Wilcoxon signed rank test). In addition
to these individual level improvements, we also found that the average error of each group’s median
estimate was significantly lower in Round Three (0.67 s.d.) than in Round One (0.76 s.d.) (N=13
trials, P<0.001, Wilcoxon signed rank test), resulting in a 12% decrease in average error, as shown
in Figures 1A and 1C.
In our analysis of how social influence produced these group-level improvements in the
median, our initial expectation was that self-weights were independently and identically distributed
within each network. On this assumption, the DeGroot (20) model predicts that social influence in
decentralized networks can improve the group median by pushing it towards the mean of the
group’s independent estimate, which is not expected to change. Remarkably, however, we found
that, on average, each group’s mean estimate also became more accurate. After two rounds of
exposure to social influence, the average error of the group mean at Round Three (0.62 s.d.) was
significantly lower than at Round One (0.69 s.d.) (N=13 trials, P<0.01, Wilcoxon signed rank test),
resulting in a 10% reduction in the average error of the group mean. These findings can be
explained with the DeGroot model by observing that individuals’ self-weights were not identically
distributed in the population.
Figure 2 shows that across all network conditions the magnitude of an individual’s revisions
from Round One to Round Three was significantly correlated with the magnitude of their initial error
(N=4340 estimates by 1040 subjects, ρ=0.41, 95% CI [0.39, 0.43], P<0.001, Analysis of
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Fig. 1. Effect of social influence on group accuracy. Average error and standard deviation in
13 experimental trials for each network condition. (A) In decentralized networks, both the mean
and the median became more accurate over two rounds of social influence. (B) In centralized
networks, the effect of social influence on the accuracy of the group mean and group median was
determined by the initial estimate of the central node. Results are conditioned on whether the
central node was in the direction of truth relative to the group estimate. (C) Total change from
Round One to Round Three with bootstrapped 95% error bars, indicating that changes shown in
panels A and B are significant. Both the mean and median of estimates in decentralized networks
became more accurate (N=13, P<0.01 for mean, P<0.001 for median). For centralized networks,
the mean and median became less accurate when the central node provided an estimate in the
opposite direction of truth (N=13, P<0.01 for both mean and median). Both the mean and median
became more accurate when the central node provided an estimate in the direction of truth (N=12,
P<0.01 for the mean and median). (D) In both network conditions, the standard deviation (i.e.,
diversity of opinions) decreased significantly after each round of revision (N=13, P<0.001 for both
conditions).
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Covariance). Because each individual completed multiple estimation tasks, we measure this
relationship between individual accuracy and revision magnitude after controlling for correlation
between estimates by the same individual. The results (Figure 2) show that initially accurate
individuals made smaller revisions to their estimates, while initially inaccurate individuals made
larger revisions. Consistent with the DeGroot model, one explanation for this revision pattern is
that individuals who were more accurate had greater self-weight in their revisions than individuals
who were less accurate. This explanation is consistent with the observed behavior, however our
analysis also needs to account for the observation that individuals who were more accurate also
had estimates that were closer to their observed neighborhood average.

Consequently, the

positive correlation between error and revision magnitude may be due to the fact that subjects
whose initial estimates were farther from their neighborhood average were inclined to make larger
revisions, rather than to the fact that more accurate individuals had a stronger self-weighting.
To control for this potentially confounding effect, we measured the partial correlation
between error and revision magnitude, while holding constant the distance between the subject’s
initial estimate and the initial neighborhood estimate. The inset in Fig. 2 shows that even with this
statistical control, more accurate individuals still made smaller revisions to their estimates than less
accurate individuals (N=4340 estimates by 1040 subjects, ρ=0.25, 95% CI [0.22, 0.28], P<0.001,
Analysis of Covariance). This suggests that accurate individuals placed more weight on their own
estimates and less weight on social information. By contrast, less inaccurate individuals had a
lower self-weight, and were more influenced by social information. For clarity, we refer to this partial
correlation between accuracy and self-weight as the “revision coefficient.”
As discussed above, each individual’s social influence weight in the network is determined
in part by their self-weight, so that individuals who place more weight on their own estimate are
also more influential in the collective estimate. When considered in the context of our theoretical
model, the correlation shown in Fig. 2 indicates that more accurate individuals had a larger social
influence weight in the network, which can pull the group estimate toward a more accurate mean.
These analyses suggest a direct positive relationship between the average revision coefficient
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Fig 2. Correlation between revision magnitude and individual error. Each point in the main
figure shows the average size of individuals’ revisions from Round One to Round Three for
individuals located in each decile of the distribution of individual error (i.e., average distance from
zero error). Measured for N=4340 estimates provided by 1040 individuals assigned to one of 13
decentralized networks or 13 centralized networks.

This figure shows a positive “revision

coefficient,” such that individuals with greater error in their initial estimates made significantly larger
revisions. Controlling for correlation between estimates by the same individual (SI Appendix), we
find a positive correlation between individual error and individual revision magnitude (N=4340,
ρ=0.41, 95% CI [0.39, 0.43], P<0.001). Inset: On the y-axis, positive values indicate larger
revisions than would be expected based on the distance between an individual’s estimate and their
neighborhood estimate. On the x-axis, positive values indicate greater initial error than would be
expected given the distance between an individual’s estimate and their neighborhood estimate.
After controlling for the distance between each individual’s initial estimate and the average estimate
of their neighborhood, there is still a significant correlation between individual error and individual
revision magnitude (N=4340, ρ=0.25, 95% CI [0.22, 0.28], P<0.001).
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among the members of a group and the expected improvement in the accuracy of the group mean.
Fig. 3A shows, for decentralized networks, the correlation between the improvement in the group
mean for each question, and the group’s revision coefficient for that question, for each of the 59
group estimation tasks completed in decentralized networks.

Because each group completed

multiple estimation tasks, these analyses control for correlations across multiple estimates made
by the same group.
Consistent with theoretical expectations, the correlation shown in figure 3A indicates that
in decentralized networks, groups with higher revision coefficients also exhibited larger
improvements in group accuracy (N=59 estimation tasks, ρ=-0.71, 95% CI [-0.82, -0.56]. By
contrast, figure 3B shows that centralized networks (as discussed below) exhibited no significant
correlation between a group’s average revision coefficient and a change in group accuracy (N=57
estimation tasks, ρ=-0.16, 95% CI [-0.33, 0.10]).
Figure 3A indicates that, in decentralized networks, the greater the correlation between
individual accuracy and self-weight, the more likely it is that the group mean will improve. Additional
simulation analyses (see Appendix figure A2) show that in decentralized networks a positive
revision coefficient is sufficient to produce increases in group accuracy consistent with our empirical
findings. Notably, across all experimental trials, the average revision coefficient for all subjects was
positive suggesting that in very large populations with decentralized networks, social influence is
likely to generate consistent improvements in the accuracy of the group mean.

Comparison with Control Condition. These improvements in both the mean and the median, as
well as the accuracy of individuals’ estimates, all contrast with the results from the control condition
(i.e., without social influence). Subjects in the control condition were able to revise their answers
several times, but were not provided any information about the estimates of other participants.
Between Round One and Round Three, groups in the control condition showed only a small (3%)
decrease in average standard deviation, which was significantly smaller than the reduction in
diversity in decentralized networks (43%) and centralized networks (42%) (N=21, 13 experimental
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Figure 3. Correlations with changes in group mean.

Shown are all 59 estimation tasks

completed over 13 experimental trials. In centralized networks, two estimation tasks are omitted
where the central node did not provide any response.

Decentralized networks show all 59

estimation tasks. (A) In decentralized networks, the “revision coefficient” for each group estimate
– i.e., the partial correlation for all members of a network between individuals’ accuracy and their
revision magnitudes on a given estimation task – is highly correlated with the change in the error
of the group mean (N=59, ρ=-0.71, 95% CI [-0.84, -0.51]). On estimation tasks in which groups
exhibited larger revision coefficients, they showed significantly greater improvements in the
accuracy of the group mean. (B) By contrast, in centralized networks, there was no significant
correlation between the revision coefficient and the change in group mean (N=57, ρ=-0.16, 95% CI
[-0.33, 0.10]). (C) In centralized networks, the change in the group mean is strongly correlated with
the behavior of the central node. The difference between the initial group estimate and the initial
estimate of the central node is highly correlated with the change in the group’s estimate (N=57,
ρ=0.92, 95% CI [0.88, 0.95]). When central node has an estimate larger than group mean, the
group mean typically increased; when the central node is below the group mean, the group mean
typically decreased.
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trials and 8 control trials, P<0.001 for both comparisons, Wilcoxon rank sum test). The opportunity
for revision produced a small (3%) decrease in average individual error even in the absence of
social information (N=8 control trials, P<0.001, Wilcoxon signed rank test).

However, this

improvement was significantly smaller than the 23% improvement by individuals in decentralized
networks (N=21, 13 experimental and 8 control trials, P<0.001, Wilcoxon rank sum test). Moreover,
in the control condition, these individual improvements produced no significant changes in the
accuracy of either the group mean (P>0.94) or the group median (P>0.64). These results indicate
that the improvements in collective judgment observed in decentralized networks are not explained
by independent learning effects, but are due to the network dynamics of social influence.

Social Influence in Centralized Networks. In each centralized network, one randomly selected
participant was given disproportionate exposure to the rest of the network by being given many
more network ties than other. Because these central individuals had more network ties than other
individuals, they had much greater weight in the resulting network of social influence. As expected,
the diversity of estimates in centralized networks (shown in Fig. 1D) significantly decreased after
social influence (N=13 trials, P<0.001, Wilcoxon signed rank test), reducing the average standard
deviation by 42%. However, averaged over all trials, social influence in centralized networks did
not reliably improve either the group mean (P>0.63) or the group median (P>0.78). Instead, as
predicted by the DeGroot model, the effects of social influence were determined by the initial
estimates of the central individual.
To analyze these effects, we divided the group estimates in centralized networks into two
categories, based on the initial estimate of the central nodes. In one category (“center toward
truth”) the influence of the central node is expected to increase the accuracy of the group mean.
This category includes estimates in which the central node was more accurate than the group
mean, and also estimates in which the central node was less accurate, but was on the opposite
side of the truth from the group mean. For instance, if the true value is 100 and the group mean is
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90, a central node with an estimate of either 105 (more accurate) or 120 (less accurate) will pull
the group toward the truth. The second category (“center away from truth”) includes trials in which
the estimate of the central node pulled the group mean away from the truth. For instance, if the
estimate of the central node is instead 70. This analytical strategy was used to identify the effects
of social influence on both the group mean and the group median, as reported below.
All 13 trials produced responses to at least one question in which the central individual was
away from truth relative to the group estimate, while only 12 trials produced responses where the
central individual was towards truth. Accordingly, our analyses for each category use N=13 trials
and N=12 trials, respectively. As shown in Fig. 1B and 1C, when the central individual’s estimate
was toward truth, the average error of the group mean after social influence (0.32 s.d.) was 43%
lower than the average error of the group mean before social influence (0.56 s.d.), producing a
significant increase in group accuracy (N=12 trials, P<0.01, Wilcoxon signed rank test).
Correspondingly, the same analysis for the median showed that the error of the median also
decreased significantly by 48% in these group estimations from Round One (0.70 s.d.) to Round
Three (0.36 s.d.) (N=12 trials, P<0.01, Wilcoxon signed rank test). Similarly, when the central
individual provided an estimate that was away from truth, social influence increased the error of the
group mean by 19% and the error of the median by 32% (Fig. 1B and 1C), significantly reducing
the accuracy of both the mean and the median of estimates (N=13 trials, P<0.01 for both
comparisons, Wilcoxon signed rank test).
Figure 3C shows the effects of the central node on the collective estimate for each of the
57 estimation tasks in which the central node offered a response. As above, because each group
completed multiple estimation tasks, these analyses control for correlations between multiple
estimations made by the same group. The positive slope in Fig. 3C (N=57 estimation tasks, ρ=0.92,
95% [0.88, 0.95]) indicates that the group estimates in centralized networks moved toward the initial
belief of the central individual – i.e., higher estimates by the central node made the group mean
increase, while lower estimates made the group mean decrease.
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Robustness. To conclude our analyses, we examined the robustness of our theoretical and
experimental findings under variations in the network parameters, such as average degree, graph
density, and population size. Model simulations predict that graph density and average degree
have no effect on the results observed in our experimental study. However, we found that the
effects of social influence on the wisdom of crowds are significantly strengthened with larger
population sizes.

Our analyses indicate that recent small group studies arguing that social

influence undermines the wisdom of crowds (even in a decentralized network) (Lorenz et al, 2011)
were insufficiently statistically powered to identify the improvements in collective accuracy that we
found. Simulations based on the publicly available data from these studies show that Type II error
can explain the negative findings from previous experiments (see Appendix figure A3).

Discussion
Our study differs in several respects from previous work on the network dynamics of collective
intelligence.

Unlike research on social coordination (Centola & Baronchelli, 2015; Dall’Asta,

Baronchelli, Barrat, & Loreto, 2006; Judd, Kearns, & Vorobeychik, 2010) and group problem solving
(Bavelas, 1950; Lazer & Friedman, 2007; Shore, Bernstein, & Lazer, 2015), our study does not
consider situations where social interaction is necessary for groups to achieve a collective outcome.
Instead, we identify how the network dynamics of social influence can affect collective estimation
tasks in situations where social influence has been predicted to have a negative effect on the quality
of group judgments (Baddeley, 2010; Janis, 1982; Lorenz et al., 2011; Myers & Bishop, 1971;
Sunstein, 2006; Surowiecki, 2004).
Our finding that groups have the ability to generate accurate estimates even in the
presence of social influence has useful implications for the design of several kinds of collective
decision processes. As described in previous studies (Lorenz et al., 2011), if social influence did
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indeed undermine the wisdom of crowds, then democratic institutions and organizational decision
procedures could be improved by preventing people from communicating during a voting process.
Based on these ideas, commercial and non-profit organizations have implemented
automated aggregation tools in order to collect individuals’ independent beliefs in ways that
minimize the information exchanged between them (Bonabeau, 2009). Our findings argue against
this approach to aggregation. In contrast, we have shown how social learning in networks can
amplify the influence of accurate individuals, leading to both individual and collective judgments
that are more accurate than those which could typically be obtained by independent aggregation
alone.

We therefore anticipate that process interventions within political discussion settings

(Fishkin & Luskin, 2005) and organizational decision contexts (Green, Armstrong, & Graefe, 2007)
may benefit more from approaches that manage communication networks, rather than approaches
that attempt to increase independence in the aggregation process.

Appendix A: Estimation Tasks and Subject Experience
The experimental interface is shown in Figure A1, indicating Round 1 as an example. For each
question, participants first provided an independent response without any social information
(Round 1). Then, subjects in network conditions were shown the average (mean) response of their
network neighbors, and were given a chance to revise their answer (Round 2). This design ensured
that users in both network conditions received identical user experiences. This second step was
repeated, providing a total of three answers from each individual for a given question, and the
screenshot of the final chance to revise after social exposure (Round 3). Subjects had one minute
to provide each response, such that each round lasted a maximum of one minute. This entire
process was repeated for four unique count-based or five unique percentage-based questions,
resulting in a total of twelve count-based or fifteen percentage-based responses from each subject.
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In trials where we provided count-based estimation tasks, each group completed four
tasks. We conducted 6 independent experimental trials of this kind of task, with four questions
each, producing a total of 24 count-based estimations by decentralized networks, and 24 countbased estimations by centralized networks. We used a unique question set for each trial, yielding
6 unique question sets. To create independent control groups for each question set, we ran 6
independent control groups, each with 40 individuals, producing 24 control group estimations.
In trials where we used percentage-based estimation tasks, each group completed five
estimation tasks. We conducted 7 independent experimental trials of this kind of task, with five
questions each, producing a total of 35 percentage-based estimations by decentralized networks,
and 35 percentage-based estimations by centralized networks. We used 2 unique question sets,
which were randomly assigned across trials. One set was used in three of the trials, the other was
used in four of the trials. To create independent control groups for each question set, we ran 2
independent control groups, each with 40 individuals, producing 10 control group estimations.
Because control groups are composed of statistically independent individuals, we only require a
single control group for each question set to compare to the experimentally replicated trials. In
total, we observed 59 estimations by decentralized networks, 59 estimations by centralized
networks, and 34 estimations by control groups.
For count-based estimation tasks, we used four different image prompts: (A) a picture of
food, asking participants to estimate the number of calories; (B) a bowl of coins, asking participants
to estimate the number of coins; (C) a jar of candies, asking participants to estimate the number of
candies; and (D) a picture showing several consumer goods, asking participants to estimate the
total cost of all the items. A unique set of image prompts based on these four categories was used
for each of the six trials in which subjects completed count-based estimation tasks.
For percentage-based questions, we used five estimation tasks, each with its own image
prompt: (A) an image of dots of two colors; (B) a crowd of people (C) a crowd of people holding
umbrellas; (D) the numbers 1 through 10 repeated many times in different colors; and (E) a
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rectangle with a dark purple and a light purple segment. Two questions were created for each
image prompt, one asking subjects to estimate a percentage-based parameter, and the other
asking for the complement of that parameter. For example, in image prompt (B) showing a crowd
of people, in three trials subjects were asked “What percentage of people in this photograph are
wearing hats?” and in four trials subjects were asked “What percentage of people in this photograph
are not wearing hats?” By using question sets that asked participants to estimate either a value or
its complement, we obtained a wider variety of estimate distributions.

Appendix B: Theoretical Predictions for Social Influence in the Wisdom of Crowds
To model the effect of social influence on group accuracy, we first estimate the self-weight (αi) each
individual placed on their own belief for each estimate in our experimental study. We then measure
the relationship between error and this self-weight. We then use the coefficient from this regression
in our simulation, adding a variable noise term to allow us to continuously vary the strength of the
correlation between -1 and +1. Our simulation results show that a strong positive correlation
between accuracy and self-weight is sufficient to generate an improvement in collective accuracy,
while a strong negative correlation leads to an increase in error. When this correlation is zero, the
group converges on the mean in decentralized networks.

In contrast, consensus beliefs in

centralized networks are determined almost entirely by the network structure and the distribution
of individual beliefs. Even when there is a strong positive or negative correlation between accuracy
and self-weight, collective beliefs after social influence are largely determined by the belief of
central individuals.

Model Definition. To identify theoretical expectations for the effect of social influence on the wisdom
of crowds, we use agent-based simulations to model the change in group mean and median under a
range of assumptions. In particular, we vary several parameters:

network structure, including

centralization, density, and average degree; initial opinion distribution shape, including normal
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(symmetrical) and log-normal (asymmetrical); the accuracy of the collective estimate prior to social
influence; the correlation among individuals between error and revision magnitude; and the decay in
individual responsiveness to social influence (i.e., the increase in self-weight) over time.
As described in the main text, our model of collective judgments builds on DeGroot’s (1974)
formalization of local information aggregation, in which an agent i updates their estimate, Rt,i , after
being exposed to the estimates of their network neighbors,

Rt , jN i .

We define an agent’s revision

process with three components: their own estimate; the estimates of network neighbors; and “selfweight,” or the amount of weight they place on their own estimate relative to the estimates of their
network neighbors. Each agent responds to social information by adopting a weighted mean of
their own estimate and the estimates of their neighbors, according to the rule:

Rt 1,i   i  Rt ,i  (1   i )  Rt , jNi ,

(1)

where the value Rt,i indicates the response of agent i at time t; αi indicates the self-weight an agent
places on their own initial estimate; (1-αi) indicates the weight they place on the average estimate
of their network neighbors; and Rt , jN i indicates the average estimate of agent i’s network neighbors
at time t. Outcomes are therefore determined by three parameters: the communication network
(i.e., who can observe whom), the distribution of independent estimates

R1,i

and the distribution

of self-weights αi.
At the population level, this model describes the dynamics of a group belief as a function
of the distribution of initial, independent beliefs and an adjacency matrix defining a network of social
influence. In this network, a tie from node A to node B is weighted and directed, and represents
the amount of weight node A places on the belief of node B, where the sum of the outgoing tie
weights for a single node i equals (1 - αi).
That is, in the network adjacency matrix A:
𝐴𝑖,𝑗 =

1 − 𝛼𝑖
𝑘𝑖
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whenever i ≠ j

(2)

and
Ai,i = αi

(3)

where ki equals the total number of network neighbors who are observed by an agent. Since an
agent’s self-weight equals αi, and the sum of outgoing ties equals (1-αi), then we can define an
agent’s revised belief as a weighted mean of their initial unrevised belief and the average belief of
network neighbors.
Using this model of revision, we can estimate the parameter αi for a given revision by a
given individual as a function of their initial estimate Rt,i, their social signal

R jN i ,t , and their revised

estimate Rt+1,i. Rearranging equation 1 above shows the solution

i 

Rt 1,i  Rt , jNi
Rt ,i  Rt , jNi

(4)

and we use this equation to estimate self-weights in our empirical data. Because our theoretical
model assumes that 0 ≤ α ≤1, we discard values that fall outside this range in the remainder of
this analysis. Over 80% of estimated values fall between zero and one.
Using standard OLS regression, we estimate the following relationship between error and
𝛼 in our experimental data:
𝛼𝑖 = 0.74 − 0.05𝜀𝑖

(5)

where εi indicates the absolute value of the error for an estimate by agent i. For count-based
response distributions, εi = |ln(Ri) – ln(truth)| where ln indicates the natural log function, while for
symmetric distributions εi = |Ri – truth| where Ri indicates the estimate by agent i. We use this
relationship between error and self-weight in our simulations, so that each simulated agent’s 𝛼 is
determined according to this empirically estimated model and their randomly generated estimate.
We simulate outcomes for two conditions, one in which initial responses (R1) are sampled
from a skewed distribution and one in which initial responses are sampled from a symmetric
distribution. For the skewed distribution, we sample a log-normal distribution (shape parameters
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μ=6.1, σ=0.7; mean=600; s.d.=500) and for the symmetric distribution we sample a random normal
distribution with equivalent mean and standard deviation (μ=600, σ=500). These parameters
generate estimate distributions comparable to those observed in our experimental data, while
allowing us to directly test for the effect of a skew. We test three levels of accuracy with respect to
the group mean: underestimation (truth = mean + 150), overestimation (truth = mean - 150), and
exactly accurate (truth=mean). In the case of the skewed distribution, this means that the median
underestimates the true value whenever the mean underestimates the true value; and the median
overestimates the true value when the mean overestimates the true value; and the median
underestimates the true value when the mean is exactly accurate.
Each simulation is initialized by generating a random binary communication network,
assigning each agent a belief according the estimate distribution as defined above, and assigning
each agent a value for 𝛼 from a random distribution as estimated above. A key parameter of
interest is the strength of correlation between error and revision magnitude, as described above.
To vary correlation, we generate a weighted combination 1 of the value for 𝛼 as determined by
equation 5 (ie, a degenerate random variable) and a random variable drawn from the empirical
distribution of 𝛼. To generate a negative correlation between error and αi (ie, a positive correlation
between accuracy and αi ) we use the arithmetic complement of equation 5. Once initialized,
simulations are deterministic: the vector of agent beliefs, the vector of αi , the binary network
adjacency matrix, and the number of rounds fully determine the outcome of a simulation. Using

1

Variation in correlation is accomplished with the following algorithm: for each agent, we randomly draw
an initial estimate from a distribution that matches our empirical data. Based on the error of this estimate,
we generate two values. The first term, A1, is a fixed determinate value generated according to equation 5
above. The second term, A2, is random variable sampled from the generated distribution of A 1. The final
value for α is defined as α = wA1 + (1-w)A2 where w is a weight parameter that determines the strength
of correlation between error and α. When w=1, correlation=1. When w=0, correlation=0. Since A 1 and A2
have the same distribution, this varies the correlation between α and error while holding mean α constant.
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this process, we simulate outcomes comparable to our experimental design, calculating the
outcome after two revisions (three rounds).

Social Influence in Decentralized Networks. To identify the general network dynamics of social
influence, Fig. A2 and A3 show the effect of social influence under a range of assumptions about
response distribution, group accuracy, and individual behavior for networks with N=1000 nodes.
When self-weight is not correlated to accuracy (center point on the x-axis of each panel) the mean
of the group is unaffected by social influence. When independent estimates follow a skewed
distribution, the group median is drawn toward the mean (Fig. A3, Panels A-C). When more
accurate individuals have a higher value for α (correlation > 0) the group mean also becomes more
accurate (Fig. A3). When inaccurate individuals make smaller revisions than accurate individuals
the group mean becomes less accurate (Fig. A3). Empirically, we found that accurate individuals
tend to place more weight on their own beliefs. These simulated outcomes are consistent with our
empirical finding (Fig. 3 in the Main Text) that in networks where this correlation was strongly
positive, the collective belief became more accurate.

Effect of Centralization on Group Accuracy. To test the effect of network centralization in networks
of the same size as our empirical trials, we simulated outcomes for a continuous range of
centralization while holding density and population size fixed in networks of size N=40 in a group
that underestimates the true value. To illustrate the effect of the most central node’s accuracy on
the collective change in the group mean, we condition the results on whether the most central node
held an initial belief that was in the direction of truth relative to the initial group mean, or whether
the central node pulled the group away from truth at the initial round. When the most central
member held a belief that represented a movement away from truth (Fig. A4, bottom set of points),
the group mean after social influence decreased with centralization, leading to an increase in error.
When the most central member held a belief that fell in the direction of truth (Fig. A4, top set of
points), the group mean after social influence increased with centralization, leading to a decrease
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in error. Each panel in the figure shows one of three assumptions about individual error and
movement: perfect negative correlation, no correlation, and positive correlation. In decentralized
networks, the correlation between accuracy and self-weight determines the effect of social
influence. While the potential for improvement is greatest when centralization is exactly equal to
zero, this effect is robust to a small amount of centralization. However, as centralization increases,
the wisdom of crowds is increasingly determined by the belief of the most prominent individual.

Robustness to Variation in Density and Average Degree. In contrast to the large effect of network
centralization, network density (Fig. A5) and average degree (Fig. A6) have negligible effects on
group accuracy. To test the robustness of our experimental results, we simulate outcomes in a
range of conditions with networks of size N=40. The simulations hold centralization fixed at 0 and
increase the number of ties in a random network with homogeneous degree. As density increases,
there is a slight increase in the change in the median due only to an increase in the speed of
convergence (Fig. A5). In the long run, density has no effect, as asymptotic results are determined
only by the eigenvector of the adjacency matrix. The minimal short-term effect is not enough to
account for the difference between networks in our empirical observations, and the effect of network
centralization more than overcomes the small effect of density in our experimental trials,. Moreover,
whatever effect density does have in our experimental outcomes, it acts in opposition to the effects
of centralization, making our empirical estimation of the effect of centralization on the wisdom of
crowds conservative.
The effects of average degree are similar to the effects of density in direction and
magnitude for the change in the group mean (Fig. A6). The simulations hold density fixed at 0.05
(which is the density of the centralized network in our experimental trials), and keep centralization
at 0 by using random networks with homogeneous degree distributions. Average degree is
increased by increasing the population size, while holding density fixed. This procedure uses
population sizes ranging from N=40 to N=1000. We also ran simulations holding density fixed at
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0.1, which is the density of the decentralized network in our study, and the results were qualitatively
similar.

Appendix C: Supplemental Figures

Figure A1. Screenshot of the experimental interface, Round 1.

57

Figure A2. This figure shows the change in the mean and change in the error of the mean for
simulated trials. The x-axis of each panel indicates the correlation between error and αi. The yaxis for each panel indicates the change in the mean and the change in the error of the mean, as
measured in units of standard deviation. The top row shows outcomes for a right-skewed (log
normal) response distribution, and the bottom row shows a symmetrical (normal) distribution. In
the left column, the mean of independent responses underestimates the truth by 0.5 standard
deviations; in the center, the mean equals the truth; and in the right column, the mean
overestimates the truth. Theoretical predictions are all consistent with our experimental results.
When correlation is greater than zero (accurate individuals move less) the group mean always
either improves or remains the same. When correlation equals zero, the group mean remains
unchanged. N=1,000 nodes per network, 10,000 simulations per point.
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Figure A3. This figure shows the same model parameters as Fig. S9, but displays results for
the median instead of the mean. The x-axis of each panel indicates the correlation between
accuracy and αi. The y-axis for each panel indicates the change in the mean and the change in
the error of the mean, as measured in units of standard deviation. The top row shows outcomes
for a right-skewed (log normal) response distribution, and the bottom row shows a symmetrical
(normal) distribution. In the left column, the mean of independent responses underestimates the
truth by 0.5 standard deviations; in the center, the mean equals the truth; and in the right column,
the mean overestimates the truth.

Theoretical predictions are all consistent with our

experimental results. In the skew-right distribution, the median improves in most cases. Even
in accurate symmetrical distributions, sample error leaves some room for improvement in the
median, as shown in Panel E. N=1,000 nodes per network, 10,000 simulations per point.
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Figure A4. The effect of centralization in networks on the change in the group mean. These
simulations reflect a group that underestimates the true value, and therefore an increase in group
mean indicates a decrease in error. The influence of prominent nodes has a stronger effect on
group beliefs than the correlation between accuracy and revision magnitude. Results are plotted
based on whether or not the core node is in the direction of the true value (green) or away from the
true value (red). Centralization cannot be controlled directly in network generating algorithms (see
text), and results are plotted according to the resulting centralization score for each randomly
generated network. N=40 nodes per network, 10,000 repetitions per point.
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Figure A5. The effect of density in networks on the change in the group mean. These simulations
reflect a group that underestimates the true value, and therefore an increase in group mean
indicates a decrease in error. These networks vary only in average degree, holding network size
(and centralization) constant. The densities of the two networks used in our study are noted in both
panels: the centralized (box) and decentralized (triangle) networks. N=40 nodes per network,
10,000 simulations per point

Figure A6. The effect of average degree in networks on the change in mean. These simulations
reflect a group that underestimates the true value, and therefore an increase in group mean
indicates a decrease in error. These networks are random networks where every node has the
same degree varying N and degree concomitantly in order to hold density constant. Average
degree for networks used in our study are noted in both panels: the centralized (box) and
decentralized (triangle) networks. 10,000 simulations per point.
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Figure A7. Points show the expected experimental power as a function of population size, with a
dashed line indicating standard design with 80% probability of significant results. Because the
wisdom of crowds emerges only in large groups, low population sizes are less likely to reliably
demonstrate improvement as a result of influence. With the experimental design implemented by
Lorenz et al, we estimate greater than 50% probability of type II error. Each point measures 1,000
bootstrapped p-values for data drawn from 10,000 simulated trials.
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CHAPTER 3: FROM EFFICIENT MARKETS TO EFFECTIVE INVESTORS –
INDIVIDUALS AND THE WISDOM OF CROWDS
Three economists went hunting, and came across a large deer. The first economist
fired, but missed by a meter to the left. The second economist fired, but missed by
a meter to the right. The third economist didn't fire, but shouted in triumph: “We got
it! We got it!”

Abstract
Research on the “wisdom of crowds” is based on the observation that the average belief in a group
can be accurate even when individual members are inaccurate, a phenomenon that is useful to
third-party aggregators but offers no benefit to group members as individuals. One striking example
of the divergence between collective and individual accuracy is financial forecasting, in which retail
(non-institutional) investors display the wisdom of crowds even as these same individuals lose
money compared to benchmarks. While popular theoretical accounts argue that individuals must
remain independent in order to preserve group accuracy, we test an alternative theory which
predicts that individuals can learn from each other and benefit from the wisdom of crowds. We
present the results of an experimental study in which subjects made financial forecasts before and
after learning the beliefs of peers connected to them in a social network. We find that information
exchange generates, on average, a 25% decrease in individual error while still preserving the
wisdom of the crowd. These results show that structured social networks can improve individual
performance while maintaining collective wisdom.
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Introduction
It is common in social and organizational research to treat measurements of the group as
representative of individuals within the group, and yet it can be the case that the average individual
looks nothing like the average of individuals (Mozer, Pashler, & Homaei, 2008; Way, Morgan,
Clauset, & Larremore, 2017). While the divergence between individual and group characteristics
can sometimes lead to methodological problems such as the ecological fallacy, it is also a defining
characteristic of research on collective intelligence, which studies groups as macro level
phenomena that cannot be reduced to collections of individuals (DeDeo, 2014; Krafft et al., 2016;
Woolley et al., 2010). One striking example of this paradigm can be found in the growing body of
research on the “wisdom of crowds,” which is motivated by the observation that the average belief
in a large group can be remarkably accurate even when most group members are individually
inaccurate (Galton, 1907; Page, 2007; Sunstein, 2006; Surowiecki, 2004). The remarkable ability
for groups to generate accurate beliefs from inaccurate individuals has been observed in a wide
variety of decision tasks including medical diagnoses (Kurvers et al., 2016; Wolf et al., 2015), sports
betting (Herzog & Hertwig, 2011), visual search tasks (Juni & Eckstein, 2017), geopolitical
forecasting (Atanasov et al., 2016b), and financial forecasting (Kelley & Tetlock, 2013; Nofer &
Hinz, 2014).
The advantages of belief aggregation have long been known as a method to improve the
practice of economic and financial forecasting (Clemen, 1989), and recent attention to the benefit
of belief aggregation has spurred the development of a range of aggregation methods designed to
harness the wisdom of crowds. These techniques include weighted averages accounting for past
accuracy (Budescu & Chen, 2014; Mannes et al., 2014; Welinder et al., 2010), surveys which obtain
supplementary information to triangulate accurate estimates (Koriat, 2012; Prelec et al., 2017), and
machine learning techniques to harness digital trace data (Bollen et al., 2011; Nofer & Hinz, 2014;
Peeters, 2018). These approaches are useful when an outside perspective enables large scale,
independent belief aggregation, but the wisdom of crowds as an aggregate property offers no direct
benefit to group members as individual decision-makers.

64

The divergence between group accuracy and individual accuracy is particularly salient in
the case of financial beliefs. On the one hand, financial markets demonstrate a remarkable (if
imperfect) ability to efficiently aggregate information and generate prices which reflect the
underlying asset value (B. G. Malkiel, 2003; Shiller, 2003). The wisdom of financial crowds can be
observed even when limiting analysis to retail (i.e., non-institutional) investors (Kelley & Tetlock,
2013), whose aggregated forecasts can outperform professional analysts (Nofer & Hinz, 2014). On
the other hand, however, individual investors fare relatively poorly, and their portfolios consistently
underperform compared to benchmarks (Barber, Lee, Liu, & Odean, 2009; Barber & Odean, 2000;
B. Malkiel, 2016). As a result of this divergence, identifying whether individuals can benefit from
the wisdom of crowds holds great practical importance.
The theoretical challenge facing individuals in the crowd stems from a common assumption
in wisdom of crowds research, namely that groups generate the most accurate beliefs when they
are composed of individuals who are statistically independent (H. Hong et al., 2016; Lorenz et al.,
2011; Nofer & Hinz, 2014). This assumption is based on two key arguments. One argument
emerges from Surowiecki’s (2004) influential book The Wisdom of Crowds, which popularized the
wisdom of crowds in contemporary research. This book, along with Janis’ classic Groupthink
(1982), argued that the dynamics of social influence generate group beliefs which do not reflect the
full set of information held by individuals. Page (2007) offers a second, more formal argument
based on the statistical properties of belief aggregation. Page’s “diversity prediction theorem”
draws attention to the importance of diversity (statistical variance) among individual beliefs in the
generation of accurate group beliefs. Because social influence has been commonly observed to
generate belief conformity (Asch, 1951; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Sherif, 1935; Cialdini & Goldstein,
2004)—i.e., reduced variance—the diversity prediction theorem has provided further support for
the argument that social influence undermines the wisdom of crowds (Lorenz et al., 2011).
Together, these two arguments are invoked to suggest that people must be kept socially
independent to preserve the wisdom of crowds (H. Hong et al., 2016; Lorenz et al., 2011; Nofer &
Hinz, 2014).
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Understanding whether—and how—individuals can learn from each other without
undermining the wisdom of crowds thus holds not only practical but theoretical significance. By
challenging the assumption that statistical and social independence is not required for groups to
maximize accuracy, we argue that the wisdom of crowds can emerge under much more general
conditions than might be expected based on previous literature. The possibility that crowd wisdom
might be robust to information exchange is not new to this paper, but we present a more general
and less restrictive theoretical claim than previous work. Prior theoretical models have required
that the response to social influence vary based on belief accuracy—such that individuals who are
more accurate are less likely to respond to social influence—leading to the prediction that accuracy
not only is robust to social influence but even can be improved at both the individual level (Gürçay
et al., 2015) and the group level (Becker, Brackbill, & Centola, 2017; Madirolas & de Polavieja,
2015). However, these models require some mechanism whereby individuals know (implicitly or
otherwise) their own accuracy. While a noisy correlation between accuracy and receptivity to social
influence has been found to hold empirically for simple trivia questions (Becker et al., 2017; Gürçay
et al., 2015; Madirolas & de Polavieja, 2015), it may not generalize to belief formation more
generally and thus a more robust mechanism for social learning would be valuable for advancing
research on the wisdom of crowds and understanding how groups can form accurate beliefs.
In contrast with these cognitively demanding models, we argue that social learning is a
robust mechanism that can improve individual accuracy under a wide range of conditions, even the
extreme case where the accuracy/receptivity relationship is reversed. Building on a formal model
of opinion formation in networks (DeGroot, 1974), we turn the diversity prediction theorem on its
head and argue that individuals in decentralized social networks will become more accurate after
observing each other’s beliefs by virtue of becoming more similar. We test this prediction with a
laboratory experiment in which subjects make financial forecasts before and after being exposed
to the beliefs of others in a social network.
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The Wisdom of Independent Crowds
The ability for groups to form judgements whose accuracy exceeds that of any individual member
can be explained by a model in which each individual estimate is composed of the true value, plus
an error term:
𝑥𝑖 = (θ + ε𝑖 ) ,
where xi is the judgement of the ith individual, θ is the true value to be estimated, and ε i is the error
of the ith individual (Hogarth, 1978; L. Hong & Page, 2009). Under the assumption that εi is
distributed identically and independently for all individuals, and that E[ε]=0, then the expected error
of the group (sample) mean—that is, collective error—will decrease as the group size increases,
and approach the true value. If, however, individuals belief are not independent—and thus error
terms are correlated—then the advantage of group size is diminished, and the accuracy of the
group is expected to decrease (Hogarth, 1978).
This model shows how it is that accurate collective beliefs can emerge when individuals
are independent, such that a large diversity of estimates within the groups produces individual
errors that cancel each other out. However, the assumption that E[ε]=0 is unlikely to be a reliable
property of empirical belief distributions. In many circumstances, people’s beliefs are subject to
common cognitive biases, which lead to systematic errors, such that a population will tend to
regularly under- or over-estimate the true value (Kahneman & Tversky, 1977).

Fortunately,

however, a well-known statistical regularity shows that the aggregated belief within a large
population can offer an accuracy benefit even under these circumstances, regardless of the
presence of systematic bias. Simply put, the error of the average belief in a group will always
necessarily be lower than the average error of any individual belief:
𝐸[𝑥̅ − θ ]2 = 𝐸[(𝑥𝑖 − 𝜃)2 ] − 𝐸[(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥̅ )2 ] .
This statement is well known in mathematical statistics, where it shows that the bias (error) of any
estimator (in this case, the error of the group average, indicated by the leftmost term) is equal to
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the mean squared error (the average individual error, the first term on the right) minus the variance
(group diversity, the second term on the right). This statement leads immediately to the inequality
𝐸[𝑥̅ − θ]2 < 𝐸[(𝑥𝑖 − 𝜃)2 ]
which Page (2007) terms the “crowd beats averages” law. Thus one major implication of the biaserror-variance decomposition for an estimator is that the error of the average estimate in a group
(of any size) will always be lower than the average error obtained from any individual estimate
alone.
This inequality has long been known as an explanation for the value of belief aggregation
(Hogarth, 1978; Zajonc, 1962; Zarnowitz, 1984). More recently, equation 2 has become known as
the “diversity prediction theorem” (Lorenz et al., 2011; Page, 2007) which emphasizes a second
major result of this statement: as the diversity (variance) increases, and average individual error
(mean squared error) is held constant, then group error (estimator bias) will decrease. This poses
a potential problem for organizational settings where communication is unavoidable, since social
influence between individuals has been found to increase the similarity of people’s beliefs (Asch,
1951; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Sherif, 1935), thereby reducing the
diversity of opinions in the group.
One interpretation of the diversity prediction theorem is that as the members of a group
become more similar, their collective beliefs will become less accurate (H. Hong et al., 2016; Lorenz
et al., 2011; Nofer & Hinz, 2014).

Because social influence tends to increase similarity (Asch,

1951; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955), a common assumption in aggregation
methods for extracting the wisdom of crowds is that group accuracy is maximized when individuals
are independent (H. Hong et al., 2016; Nofer & Hinz, 2014). By contrast, when group members
are aware of each other’s beliefs (through deliberation or some other form of information
exchange), social influence is expected to generate herding effects that undermine the the
accuracy of beliefs in groups (Baddeley, 2010; Lorenz et al., 2011; Surowiecki, 2004).
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Social Influence and the Wisdom of Crowds
It is certainly possible for social influence to lead people in groups to make suboptimal decisions,
as shown empirically through case studies of “groupthink” in organizations (Janis, 1982) and
theoretically in microeconomic models of herding behavior (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al.,
1992). The phenomenon of groupthink, for example, is expected to diminish the accuracy of group
decisions when group norms for cohesion prevent individuals from sharing information that runs
counter to previously established group beliefs. Case studies on the wisdom of crowds have
identified how group failure can result from the overly strong influence of group leaders, which can
similarly prevent groups from using all the information held by their members (Surowiecki, 2004).
However, these studies are not sufficient to show that social influence will always undermine group
decisions, and even as they highlight the risks of social influence they also highlight the possibility
that the negative effects of social influence can be avoided.
The present study builds on a formal model of belief formation in networks (DeGroot, 1974)
which demonstrates how structural features of a population (e.g., the network topology) can
determine whether social influence undermines group accuracy, or, conversely, whether it
facilitates social learning while preserving group accuracy. In this model, each member of a group
is assumed to start with some independent belief. Upon learning the beliefs of others connected
to them in a social network (i.e., “network neighbors”), individuals adopt a weighted average that
combines their own initial belief and the beliefs of their network neighbors. This process iterates
over time, leading groups to reach a consensus—such that every member holds the same beliefs—
in any connected network (DeGroot, 1974).
Crucially, the value of the eventual consensus—the point toward which group beliefs are
drawn—and thus group accuracy depends on structure of the influence network (Becker et al.,
2017; DeGroot, 1974). In this revision process, more central members (those observed by a
greater number of peers) contribute more weight to the consensus belief than less central
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individuals2 (DeGroot, 1974). These properties also appear in a number of related models with
varying assumptions about the individual decision-making process (Acemoglu, Dahleh, Lobel, &

Ozdaglar, 2011; Golub & Jackson, 2010; Mossel et al., 2015) and thus provide theoretical support
for the empirical observation that overly influential leaders can undermine group decisions (Janis,
1982; Surowiecki, 2004).

The important result for the present study is that “decentralized”

networks, defined as those networks in which everyone is equally connected and thus equally
central, will be drawn directly toward the mean of independent beliefs. Paradoxically, the diversity
prediction theorem guarantees that if group members converge toward the mean of independent
beliefs, then average individual error will decrease even as diversity decreases, not in spite of the
increased similarity but because of it. As a result, this model offers an explanation for observational
case studies showing that social influence undermines the wisdom of crowds (Janis, 1982;
Surowiecki, 2004) while also identifying conditions under which social influence may allow
individuals to benefit from the wisdom of crowds.
While a decentralized network can produce convergence to the mean (DeGroot, 1974), a
decentralized topology for the binary communication network (who can observe whom) is not
sufficient to guarantee that everyone is equally influential, since group beliefs are ultimately
determined by the weighted network of social influence—not just who can observe whom, but how
much they influence each other (Becker et al., 2017). For example, status and other metainformation can make certain people more influential than others. Even anonymous information
exchange is not sufficient to ensure equal influence, because group members may place variable
weight on their own belief, which alters their centrality in the resulting influence network 3. In other

2

Specifically, the asymptotic consensus is equal to a weighted mean of independent beliefs, where the
weight for each person is equal to their eigenvector centrality in the influence network (DeGroot, 1974)
3
In the model, the amount of weight each person places on their own belief is reflected as a “self-tie” in the
network, i.e. the diagonal in the adjacency matrix, which contributes to eigenvector centrality.
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words, when some individuals place more weight on their own belief and less weight on social
information, they increase their relative influence in the social network. In the extreme case, one
individual who never changes their belief would asymptotically determine the beliefs for an entire
population, as others revise their belief gradually toward social information. Although this extreme
situation is unlikely, the example illustrates how some individuals can become disproportionately
influential in a network even when information exchange is anonymous and every person is
observed by an equal number of others.
The present study tests this convergence-to-the-mean hypothesis—and its implications for
improving individual performance—in the context of financial forecasting. Before studying this
phenomenon empirically, we first tested the robustness of this hypothesis computationally by
simulating the effect of social influence for a population embedded in a network in which everyone
is equally connected, but where each individual places a variable amount of weight on social
information. We found that despite the fact that some individuals may be more influential due to
varying social weight, the group nonetheless converges on the mean of independent beliefs as
long as this weight is independently, identically distributed (i.i.d) throughout the population (see
Appendix). Another paradoxical property of the diversity prediction theorem is that individual
accuracy can improve even when the group mean becomes less accurate, and we find in simulation
that individuals can improve even under some conditions where this i.i.d. assumption is violated.
As detailed in the Appendix, these predictions hold under a wide range of empirically plausible
assumptions, offering a robust mechanism whereby groups individuals embedded in decentralized
networks will benefit from social influence. The goal of this study is to test this formal theoretical
expectation on the important task of forecasting market behavior.

The Wisdom of Financial Crowds
One of the most common and yet most controversial examples of the wisdom of crowds is the
efficient markets hypothesis (B. Malkiel, 2016; Schijven & Hitt, 2012; Surowiecki, 2004). The
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efficient markets hypothesis takes several forms, all of which share the general claim that the
current market price for an equity reflects the best possible price given available information (Fama,
1970). Informally, this theory states that if there were any information that could be used to predict
a future increase (or decrease) in the fundamental value of the asset, it would already be
incorporated into the price. Thus one implication of this hypothesis that it is impossible to “beat the
market” by investing in something that can be expected to rise in value more than the market as a
whole (B. Malkiel, 2016). Just as with the more general wisdom of crowds phenomenon, an efficient
market does not require rational individuals. Individual investors may vastly overestimate or
underestimate in the fundamental value of an asset, but those errors will cancel out in aggregate,
revealing the best possible price (B. G. Malkiel, 2003; Shiller, 2003).
Given the general difficulty (or impossibility) of beating the market, even in the presence of
occasional inefficiencies (B. G. Malkiel, 2003; Shiller, 2003), the best advice to any investor is a
passive “buy and hold” strategy with a diversified investment portfolio, rather than the active
selection and exchange of individual assets (B. Malkiel, 2016). However, despite the common
advice that “active investment” is not a profitable strategy, active investment remains a popular
pursuit among both institutional and retail investors (Barber et al., 2009; Chater, Huck, & Inderst,
2010; B. Malkiel, 2016). Due to the popularity of this do-it-yourself approach to portfolio design,
retail investment in particular provides a clear example of the divergence between collective
accuracy and individual inaccuracy. On the one hand, retail investors have been found to exhibit
the wisdom of crowds. In one study, large scale analyses of investment recommendations posted
to online investment communities were found to produce superior investments to those of
professional analysts (Nofer & Hinz, 2014). Direct analysis of retail market orders have found that
purchase behavior can predict future news sentiment, a proxy for the fundamental value of an asset
(Kelley & Tetlock, 2013). On the other hand, however, retail investors consistently tend to lose
money as compared with a buy-and-hold strategy (Barber et al., 2009; Barber & Odean, 2000; B.
Malkiel, 2016). As a result, understanding how to improve the accuracy of individual investor beliefs
is an important topic of research.
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As described above, theoretical models of belief formation (Appendix) argue that two
conditions are sufficient to allow individuals to learn from each other and thus improve their belief
accuracy without undermining the wisdom of crowds. One condition is a decentralized network
structure, which means that no single person or group of individuals can influence a
disproportionately large number of people. In practice, many social networks have been observed
to be highly “centralized” (Barabâsi et al., 2002; Eagle & Pentland, 2006; Ebel, Mielsch, &
Bornholdt, 2002;; Liljeros, Edling, Amaral, Stanley, & Aberg, 2001) including influence networks in
online investment platforms (Pan, Altshuler, & Pentland, 2012). As a result, experimental methods
are essential for identifying the effects of social influence on financial beliefs under theoretically
ideal conditions, since observational studies are constrained by the properties of existing social
networks. The second condition required for social influence to improve belief accuracy is that
individual responses to social influence are not negatively correlated with accuracy. While the first
condition—decentralized networks—can be established by embedding individuals in intentionally
structured social network networks, this second condition is an endogenous feature of investors as
a population. The importance of the relationship between error and response to social influence is
thus a key motivation for testing the effect of social influence on financial beliefs specifically, rather
than drawing conclusions solely from prior research on trivia tasks.
In the context of financial forecasting, the second condition could be violated if certain types
of investors are systematically less likely to make use of social information, and thus exert a greater
amount of influence on group beliefs. Unlike the trivia questions studied in previous research
(Becker et al., 2017; Gürçay et al., 2015; Lorenz et al., 2011; Moussaïd et al., 2013), financial
beliefs are prone to a unique set of cognitive biases, such as the tendency for people to
overestimate their ability to predict random events (Fisher & Statman, 2000; Langer & Roth, 1975).
Another common bias is optimism, which can exacerbate overconfidence (Baker & Nofsinger,
2002) and tends to be asymmetrical—people are more likely to hold overly optimistic beliefs than
overly pessimistic beliefs (Kahneman & Riepe, 1998). If it is the case that optimistic investors are
more confident and thus less responsive to social influence, than the assumptions of our model will
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be violated, and group beliefs may systematically increase their estimates (regardless of the true
value) rather than becoming reliably more accurate. Importantly, as noted above, it is possible for
individual beliefs to become more accurate even when beliefs measured at the group level become
less accurate (see Appendix). The goal of this study both to test the robustness of social learning
for individuals and also to test whether individual financial beliefs can be improved without
undermining accuracy as measured at the group level.

Methods
Our experimental design advances previous research in several ways, and is designed to test the
theory that social influence is a robust mechanism that can improve the accuracy of individual
beliefs even in the presence of cognitive biases and limited information exchange. The primary
contribution of our study is a focus on individual level outcomes, in contrast with a focus in previous
research on the accuracy of group level beliefs (Becker et al., 2017; Mellers et al., 2014; Navajas,
Niella, Garbulsky, Bahrami, & Sigman, 2018), which can mask large variations in individual level
accuracy (Mozer et al., 2008). One particular concern facing individuals in crowds is that if the
group as a whole is pulled toward the group mean, it may be the case that individuals who are
initially accurate become less accurate as a result of social influence.

If this occurs, the

improvement for the least accurate individuals would come at the cost of reduced accuracy for the
most skilled investors. While one prior study (Gürçay et al., 2015) was designed to examine the
effect social influence on individual accuracy, their analysis did not identify whether the benefits
accrued to all group members or whether the improvement for the least accurate members came
at a cost to the most accurate members. Moreover, this study examined only trivia questions, which
do not reflect cognitive biases found in tasks such as financial forecasting.
Another limitation of this study (Gürçay et al., 2015) is that the design allowed participants
to engage in detailed discussion and displayed their reported confidence level, which was based
on their theory that social influence increases belief accuracy due to a correlation between
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confidence and accuracy.

The presence of multiple types of information exchange make it

impossible to distinguish the mechanisms that shaped individual beliefs, which limits replicability.
In contrast, we study the effect of purely informational influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955) on belief
accuracy. We test the theory that people can become more accurate simply by knowing what their
peers believe.
One final limitation of previous research on individual accuracy is the use of experimental
designs that allowed individuals to see the beliefs of the entire study population (Gürçay et al.,
2015). However, individuals in organizational settings frequently interact with only a small subset
of the population, and our simulations suggest that even this limited “local” influence (Centola,
Willer, & Macy, 2005) can improve belief accuracy in networks where everyone is observed by an
equal number of peers. To test minimal sufficient conditions to improve group accuracy, we used
a web-based experimental platform in which individuals provided estimates before and after
observing information about the numeric estimates of a limited number of peers in the social group,
forming a random 4-regular graph of information exchange. To ensure that our results are robust
against the biases that shape real-world beliefs, we study effect of social influence on the accuracy
of financial forecasts.

Experimental Design. In order to test whether social influence can improve the accuracy of financial
beliefs, we conducted a web-based experiment in which 1,286 individuals forecasted the future
price of 55 exchange traded equities. For each forecast, subjects were randomized to either a
“social” condition, in which they were able to observe the belief of other participants, or a “control”
condition, in which they generated their forecast independently.
Subjects were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk. Prior to being assigned to an
experimental session, all subjects completed a survey in which they reported their investment
experience, their educational background, their personal portfolio size, and whether they were a
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professionally employed in finance. To ensure that our subject pool represented a population
comparable to that of retail investors, only those subjects who reported at least 1 year of investment
experience were invited to contribute their forecasts. Subjects were not informed that their eligibility
depended on their survey response, and thus there was no incentive for false reporting. A total of
3,484 respondents completed the enrollment survey, of which 1,575 reported one or more years of
investment experience.

All 1,575 eligible respondents were invited to participate.

Of these

subjects, 760 reported between 1 and 5 years of investment experience, 275 reported 5 to 10
years, and 251 reported greater than 10 years of experience.
Data was collected over the course of 7 experimental sessions between November 26,
2017 and December 10, 2017. For a given experimental session, all eligible participants were sent
a login link to access the experimental platform at a pre-scheduled time, in order to enable
simultaneous participation. Simultaneous participation was important both to enable information
exchange as well as to ensure that forecast accuracy was not impacted by exogenous variables
such as changes in the underlying equity value. At the scheduled time, all subjects who were
logged into the experimental platform were randomly assigned to an equity (i.e., what they were to
forecast) and an experimental condition (social or control). Subjects were allowed to participate
more than once, and were re-randomized for each experimental session. To incentivize accurate
forecasts, subjects were rewarded based on the accuracy of each individual forecast.
A single trial consisted of 80 individuals forecasting the future value of a single equity. For
each trial, 40 individuals were placed into a single, connected social network that allowed them to
observe the forecasts of 4 network neighbors. This network topology was random and undirected.
The remaining 40 individuals were assigned to the control condition, in which they provided
estimates in isolation (without any social interactions). In total, we collected data for 55 trials, each
of which was assigned a unique equity to forecast.
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Subject Experience. Once a session began, each subject was prompted to forecast the closing
price for an exchange-traded equity approximately 4 weeks after the date of the experimental
session. (The exact forecast period varied slightly between sessions to adjust for dates on which
the markets are closed). The complete list of equities is shown in the appendix (Table S1). To
provide an informational environment comparable to that in which investors typically make
decisions (and also to discourage subjects from leaving the page, and missing the forecast
submission time) the experimental interface included a stock ticker (showing prices for the previous
5 days, 1 month, 1 year, and 5 years) and recent headlines related to the equity to be forecasted
(see Appendix figure S1).
Subjects were provided 60 seconds to complete their first forecast (“Round 1”). They were
then prompted to enter their forecast again, providing a second estimate, and were given another
60 seconds for this estimate (“Round 2”). Subjects were then prompted to provide a third forecast,
and were given 60 seconds for this third and final forecast (“Round 3”). Subjects were rewarded
based on the accuracy of their final forecast.
Between revisions, subjects in the social condition were shown the average answer of their
4 network neighbors. Subjects in the control condition were simply asked to provide 3 independent
estimates. The subject experience in the social condition and the control condition was identical
except for the presence of social information. Our primary outcome of interest is whether subjects
in the social condition improved after being exposed to social information.

Analysis. Some users failed to provide a response in one or more Round, and our analysis is
conducted only for those users that provided a response to all three Rounds, providing a total of
4,071 estimates for analysis, 2,041 from the social condition and 2,030 from the control condition.
Following previous work on the wisdom of crowds (Lorenz et al., 2011; Madirolas & de Polavieja,
2015) we logarithm-transformed all prices (predicted and actual) prior to analysis.
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This

transformation controls for the fact that prices are unbounded “on the right” (stock prices/estimates
can be infinitely large) but bounded “on the left” (stock prices/estimates cannot go below zero) and
is commonly applied in stock price analyses. For each estimate, we therefore measure error as
|log(𝐸) − log(𝑇)| where E indicates the estimate, T indicates the true value, and log indicates the
natural logarithm. For small values, log(𝐸) − log(𝑇) ≈

𝐸−𝑇
𝑇

and thus error as reported here can be

interpreted as comparable to percent error. While error is always positive and measures the
average distance of an estimate from the true value, we also measure bias as log(𝐸) − log(𝑇)
which can be positive or negative and indicates whether estimates tend to systematically under- or
over-estimate the true value.
Because subjects in the social condition are not statistically independent, all outcomes are
measured at the trial level. For example, to assess the change in error, we measure the average
error across all individual estimates for each trial, producing 55 outcomes for the social condition
and 55 outcomes for the control condition. When measuring error as a function of initial accuracy,
we first measured average error for each subgroup for each trial, and then averaged the results for
each subgroup over the 55 independent trials. For all tests, statistical significance is determined
by assuming that independence only exists at the group level, such that each condition of each trial
constitutes a single independent data point.

This conservative assumption accounts for the

potential within-group correlation between individuals (e.g., if one group contains a particularly
accurate member, then all group members benefit) and thus prevents any single trial from being
overly influential in our analysis. To minimize parametric assumptions, all tests use a Wilcoxon
signed rank test.

Results
We found that social information improved the accuracy of individual forecasts without any
deleterious effects on the accuracy of the wisdom of crowds. We begin our analysis by measuring
the wisdom of crowds in our subject population, by comparing the mean price forecast to the true
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price for each stock. Because subject beliefs are independent at Round 1, we combine the
forecasts for the social and control conditions. As a benchmark for comparison, we first measure
the extent to which the current price would have predicted the future price. We find that using the
current price as the forecast had a significantly negative bias (P<0.05), consistent with the common
model of market prices as a random walk with gradual upward movement. In contrast, the average
bias of the group mean for the 55 forecasting tasks was not significantly different from zero (P>0.5)
indicating that groups neither under-estimated nor over-estimated stock prices.

This result

suggests that the wisdom-of-crowds estimate effectively incorporates predictions about the general
upward movement of the market. To quantify the relative accuracy of the wisdom of crowds against
individual forecasts, we compare the mean error of individual estimates with the error of the mean
estimate. We find that across the 55 estimation tasks, the mean estimate offers an error that was
an average of 48% lower (95% C.I. [39%, 56%]) than the error of individual subjects’ estimates.
That is, consistent with the wisdom of the crowd hypothesis, the error of the average was lower
than the average error of individuals.

Effect of Social Information on Group Beliefs. Social information significantly changed subjects’
financial forecasts. As shown in Figure 1A, social influence decreased the mean standard deviation
(𝜎̅) of estimates by over 50% from Round 1 to Round 3 (𝜎̅1 =0.11, 𝜎̅3 =0.05, P<0.001), indicating a
significant increase in the similarity of participants’ estimates. By contrast, there was no significant
change in the similarity of individual estimates in the control condition (𝜎̅1 =0.14, 𝜎̅3 =0.12, P>0.70).
Despite the increased similarity among individual answers, we found that the collective error
remained unchanged. We test this by measuring the absolute value of the error of the mean (i.e.,
the distance between the mean forecast and the true outcome) for each of the 55 estimates at
Round 1 and Round 3. If collective financial forecasting were systematically influenced by one
particular subgroup, then collective beliefs might deviate from the mean of independent beliefs.
For example, if the most optimistic investors were also the least likely make use of social
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Figure 1. Standard deviation (left) and average individual error (right) at each round, averaged
over 55 experimental trials.

information, then social influence would lead group beliefs to systematically overestimate the true
̅ ) was not
value and thus increase in error. However, we find that the error of the mean (𝐸

significantly different at Round 1 versus Round 3 (𝐸̅1 =0.033, 𝐸̅3 =0.030, P>0.38).

This result

indicates that as groups became more similar, they converged directly on the mean of independent
beliefs.

Effect of Social Information on Individual Accuracy. The diversity prediction theorem indicates that
if the standard deviation of individual estimates decreases without a change in the group mean,
then individual error must necessarily decrease. To measure individual error while controlling for
correlation between individuals in the same trial, we conduct a conservative analysis that measures
outcomes only at the group level. We first measure the average individual error at Round 1, Round
2, and Round 3 for each of the 55 trials. We then calculate the average of these 55 measurements
for each Round, shown in Figure 1B. We find that the average error (𝜀̅) for each subject’s forecast
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decreased significantly from Round 1 to Round 3 in the social condition (𝜀̅1 =0.056, 𝜀̅3 =0.042, N=55,
P<0.001), reducing the average error of each individual’s forecast by 25%.
To explain this improvement in individual accuracy, one possibility is that the reduction in
error was due to individual learning dynamics that might occur from having more time to spend on
the forecast, which provides more time to study price charts and consider the news items present
in the interface. To test for this, we also examine the change in error for the control condition.
However, we found no significant difference in the control condition between error at Round 1 and
error at Round 3 (𝜀̅1 =0.064, 𝜀̅3 =0.059, N=55, P>0.98). We also directly compared the average
change in the social condition with the average change in the control condition using a paired test
that compares each condition for the 55 trials, and found that the improvement in the social
condition was significantly larger than the improvement in the control condition (P<0.01). As a
result, although there were no significant differences in forecast accuracy between conditions in
Round 1, the final (Round 3) forecasts by individuals in the social condition were significantly more
accurate than final forecasts by individuals in the control condition (P<0.001).

Who benefits from the wisdom of crowds? The less accurate a subject’s forecast is at Round 1,
the more likely it is that their peers are more accurate than them, and thus the more likely they are
to observe social information that improves the accuracy of their forecast. At the same time, the
most accurate subjects at Round 1 are also the most likely to observe social information that draws
them away from the true value. Thus, one concern is that the collective improvement in accuracy
benefits the least accurate group members but comes at a cost to the most accurate group
members. While we found that the benefits of social information were indeed greatest for the
individuals who were the least accurate at Round 1, we also found that social information did not
harm the accuracy of individuals who were initially accurate.
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Figure 2. Social information increased accuracy for the least accurate individuals. Both panels
show outcomes based on subject error at Round 1. Quartile 1 indicates the most accurate subjects,
and Quartile 4 indicates the least accurate subjects. To control for variation in forecasting difficulty,
we assign forecasts to quartiles separately for each trial. Panel A: We first measure the change
in error from Round 1 to Round 3 for both the social and the control condition. Each bar shows the
arithmetic difference in the change in error between the social condition and the control condition,
with 95% confidence intervals based on a Wilcoxon signed rank test. A positive value indicates
that error decreased more for the social condition. Panel B: We first measure the percentage of
revisions that generate increased accuracy. We then measure the arithmetic difference in this
percentage between the social and the control condition, shown with 95% bootstrapped confidence
intervals. A positive value indicates that the social condition was more likely to improve.

To test the relative effect of social influence for accurate and inaccurate subjects, we
divided subjects for each trial into quartiles (i.e., four equally sized groups) based on their error at
Round 1, as shown in Figure 2A. If subjects revised their estimates randomly, then error for the
least (or most) accurate subjects at Round 1 would be expected to decrease (or increase) as a
result of regression to the mean. Therefore, to measure the effect of social information on belief
revision for each quartile, we calculate the arithmetic difference between the change in error in the
social condition and the change in error in the control condition. We find that for the most accurate
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subjects (Quartile 1), change in error is not significantly impacted by exposure to social information
(P>0.53). However, for the least accurate subjects (Quartile 4), the increase in accuracy (decrease
in error) is significantly larger for those subjects exposed to social information (P<0.05) than for
subjects in the control condition.

How does social influence shape forecast accuracy? One possible explanation for this effect is
that any revision after Round 1 improves belief accuracy, and that exposure to social influence
simply prompts the least accurate individuals to reconsider their forecast, producing revisions that
increase accuracy. However, social information had no effect on the likelihood (P) that subjects
would revise their estimates, measured either for the group as a whole (𝑃̅𝑠𝑜𝑐 =78%, 𝑃̅𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑙 =76%,
P>0.27) or for the least accurate individuals (Quartile 4) (𝑃̅𝑠𝑜𝑐 =83%, 𝑃̅𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑙 =83%, P>0.98).
While social information did not increase the likelihood of revision, it did increase the
likelihood that subjects who made revisions would increase in accuracy, as shown in Figure 2B.
Among the most accurate subjects (Quartile 1), only 24% of those who revised their answer were
more accurate at Round 3 than Round 1; however this effect was the same in both the social
influence and control conditions, and we therefore conclude that the quality of revisions for initially
accurate subjects was not significantly impacted by the presence of social information (𝑃̅𝑠𝑜𝑐 =22%,
𝑃̅𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑙 =25%, P>0.39). For the least accurate subjects (Quartile 4), however, social information
significantly increased the probability that revisions would generate more accurate forecasts
(P<0.001). In the social condition, 86% of revisions by the least accurate subjects resulted in more
accurate final forecasts, while in the control condition only 74% of revisions by the least accurate
subjects resulted in increased accuracy.
The way that individuals responded to social information mediated whether it had a positive
effect on the quality of their forecasts. Some participants used social information as a positive
signal, and moved toward it. However, others used the information as a negative signal, and moved
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Use of Social
Information
Move Toward
Move Away

Revision 1

Revision 2

(Round 1 to 2)

(Round 2 to 3)

-0.025

[-0.038, -0.01]

-0.025

[-0.036, -0.01]

0.008

[ 0.004, 0.01]

-0.002

[-0.016, 0.01]

Table 1. Change in error as a function of response to social information. Brackets indicate 95%
bootstrapped confidence intervals. Error decreased for those individuals who revised their answer
towards social information, and increased for those individuals who revised their answer away from
social information.

away from it. People who responded positively to social information showed significantly greater
improvements as a result of revision. Table 1 shows the average change in error for the two types
of responses to social information (moving towards or away) as measured for the revision between
Round 1 and Round 2, as well as for the revision between Round 2 and Round 3. We find that
individuals who revised their estimates in the direction of social information saw the largest
improvement, significantly greater than individuals who revised their estimates away from
information (P<0.001 for both the first revision and the second revision). In contrast, individuals
who revised their answer away from social information saw a significant increase in error for the
first revision (P<0.001) and no significant change for the second revision (P>0.2).

Discussion
While a common argument in prior research is that social influence undermines group decisions
(Armstrong, 2006; Janis, 1982; Lorenz et al., 2011; Nofer & Hinz, 2014), our research contributes
to a growing body of evidence arguing that managed communication can improve the accuracy of
group beliefs (Becker et al., 2017; Golub & Jackson, 2010; Gürçay et al., 2015). A common
tendency in previous research on the wisdom of crowds has been a focus on group level metrics
of accuracy (Becker et al., 2017; Galton, 1907; Lorenz et al., 2011; Nofer & Hinz, 2014), despite
the fact that groups can produce accurate estimates even as individuals make decisions based on
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inaccurate beliefs. In financial forecasting, this disparity is reflected in wise crowds and efficient
markets composed of individuals who largely lose money due to opportunity cost. To identify
conditions under which individuals can benefit from the wisdom of crowds, we studied financial
forecasts to test a theory which predicts, with minimal assumptions, that individuals can learn
through informational influence in decentralized networks.
Like any experiment, the design decisions that provided control also induced constraints
that limit generalizability. The short time period of the experimental design meant that subjects had
limited ability to produce carefully consider analyses of the fundamental value of the stock.
However, available evidence suggests that few retail investors engage in such calculated behavior
(Bhattacharya, Hackethal, Kaesler, Loos, & Meyer, 2012; Chater et al., 2010). Additionally, one
benefit of studying financial forecasts, in contrast with trivia questions, is to test whether results are
robust to the presence of common cognitive biases. Because increased reaction time is expected
to exacerbate cognitive biases (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Wright, 1974), this
limitation suggests that our results are a conservative test of the ability for beliefs to improve
accuracy in the face of cognitive biases.
Although we show that social influence can improve belief accuracy, our results don’t mean
that social influence will always be beneficial. The mechanisms described in case studies on
Groupthink (Janis, 1982) derive from a number of social processes that are not reflected in
anonymous information exchange limited to numeric signals. This experimental process was
designed to test minimal sufficient conditions to improve belief accuracy, and our results should be
interpreted with caution when considering social influence in day-to-day settings, where the
influence network is shaped by normative pressures (Davis & Greve, 1997) and status effects (Burt,
1987). We anticipate that future research will be able to identify which constraints in our present
design can be relaxed while allowing (and even improving) individual learning and maintaining the
wisdom of crowds.
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One important feature of our design which is consistent with social networks in practice is
that our subjects was directly exposed to only a limited set of other people. Despite these limited
information sets, those individuals who revised their beliefs to become more similar to peers saw
greater gains in accuracy. One characteristic of such “sparse” networks is that even as individuals
directly interact with a small subset of the population, they indirectly influence and are influenced
by the entire population. This influence results from iterated revisions over time, by which a
person’s network of influence extends far beyond their immediate connections. As a result, our
findings suggest that people can learn from the wisdom of crowds even without any centralized
information exchange, due to the ability for information to diffuse through networks.

Conclusion. Despite the limitations imposed by our experimental design, the theory and results
presented here support the argument that social networks can allow individuals to benefit from the
wisdom of crowds under a wide range of conditions. In contrast with previous theories that require
a correlation between accuracy and the use of social information (Becker et al., 2017; Gürçay et
al., 2015), we argue that social influence is a robust mechanism which can reliably improve
individual belief accuracy under a wide range of conditions. Although we found no evidence of a
meaningful correlation between confidence and accuracy in this study (which would have been
accompanied by an increase in accuracy of the mean [Becker et al., 2017]), we nonetheless found
that individual beliefs improve, simply by virtue of becoming more similar.
As organizational decisions are increasingly mediated by digital platforms (Bailey,
Leonardi, & Barley, 2012; Bonabeau, 2009; Cowgill & Zitzewitz, 2015), research on structured
information exchange will become increasingly important to understanding how organizations can
harness the wisdom of crowds. By presenting a simple and replicable method to improve the
accuracy of beliefs formed by individuals in groups, our design using minimal numeric signals
provides a benchmark expectation of improvement, against which different theories of moderating
factors can be tested. Future work should not be limited to the study of strictly numeric informational
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influence, as the theoretical framework that we adopt to make our argument (DeGroot, 1974) can
be used to describe the effect of social influence on belief accuracy for a wide range of
mechanisms. The processes that shape influence such as status and expertise can be reflected
in the tie strength between individuals. Thus, the dynamics of belief formation in contexts such as
face-to-face meetings (Janis, 1982; Surowiecki, 2004) and informal organizational networks
(Krackhardt & Hanson, 2001) can both be described in terms of the weighted, directed network of
social influence that we study here. In contrast with statistical research aimed at optimizing the
aggregation of independent estimates by external observers, our study highlights the ways in which
social networks can spread the wisdom of crowds to individuals within the organization itself. We
hope that these results will thus push researchers past the question of whether social influence
helps or harms group decisions, and towards an examination of how social influence can be most
effectively harnessed to allow the wisdom of crowds to shape beliefs in organizations.

Appendix A: Theoretical Predictions for the Effect of Social Influence
To develop theoretical predictions for the effect of social influence on the accuracy of group beliefs,
we use simulations to measure the effect of (a) correlation between accuracy and response to
social influence, and (b) network centralization (Figure A1). In contrast with group accuracy, which
improves only in decentralized networks, we find that individual accuracy can improve in centralized
networks even when the group level (mean) belief becomes less accurate (Figure A1, right hand
side). However, the effect of social influence in centralized networks depends entirely upon the
accuracy of central nodes. We also find that individual improvement is sensitive to the correlation
between accuracy and response to social influence. In decentralized networks where there is a
strong negative correlation (such that accurate individuals revise their beliefs more, and inaccurate
individuals revise their beliefs less) both group error and individual error increases. However, even
this increase in individual error only occurs when group beliefs are initially inaccurate. When group
beliefs are initially accurate, individual error decreases under all conditions. Taken together, these
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simulations suggest that the improvement of individual accuracy is a robust phenomenon under a
wide (but not exhaustive) range of empirically plausible assumptions, even in cases where groups
may become less accurate.

Figure A1. The top row shows the effect of social influence on the error of the mean belief. The
bottom row shows the effect of social influence on average individual error. The left column shows
the effect of social influence in decentralized networks as a function of the correlation between
accuracy and the response to social influence. The right column shows the effect of social influence
as a function of network centralization, when the correlation between accuracy and the response
to social influence is zero. In each quadrant, the left panel shows the effect of social influence
when groups are initially accurate, and the right panel shows the effect of social influence when
groups are initially inaccurate. Simulations reflect experimental parameters, and thus study a
population of N=40 making two revisions (three estimates) with k=4 neighbors per node in a
decentralized network. Minimum 100 simulation repetitions per point. Initial beliefs are drawn from
a random normal distribution with σ=1 and either μ=1 or μ =0.
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Appendix B: Experimental Design Details

Figure A2. Screenshot of the experimental interface.
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Equity
AAPL
AMZN
FB
GOOG
IBM
IFLY
INTC
NFLX
SPY
TAN
TWTR
VNQ
XBI
CMCSA
DELL
EBAY
GRUB
HPQ
NVIDIA
PYPL
SNAP
TSLA
DIS
EXPE
FORD
XRT
SBUX
WFC
YELP

Trial Date
11/26/2017
11/26/2017
11/26/2017
11/26/2017
11/26/2017
11/26/2017
11/26/2017
11/26/2017
11/26/2017
11/26/2017
11/26/2017
11/26/2017
11/26/2017
11/29/2017
11/29/2017
11/29/2017
11/29/2017
11/29/2017
11/29/2017
11/29/2017
11/29/2017
11/29/2017
12/2/2017
12/2/2017
12/2/2017
12/2/2017
12/2/2017
12/2/2017
12/2/2017

Equity
CSCO
CITI
NXP
ORCL
QCOM
SONY
TRIP
CARZ
FDN
PFE
VZ
VOD
XSD
XTH
AET
AAL
BOFA
CVS
DAL
FOX
GE
JPM
M
NVS
SINA
TWX

Table A1. List of forecasting tasks.
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Trial Date
12/3/2017
12/3/2017
12/3/2017
12/3/2017
12/3/2017
12/3/2017
12/3/2017
12/9/2017
12/9/2017
12/9/2017
12/9/2017
12/9/2017
12/9/2017
12/9/2017
12/10/2017
12/10/2017
12/10/2017
12/10/2017
12/10/2017
12/10/2017
12/10/2017
12/10/2017
12/10/2017
12/10/2017
12/10/2017
12/10/2017

Conclusion

Social Influence in Decentralized Networks. The research inspiring this dissertation shared a
common theoretical expectation for the wisdom of crowds:

that individuals must remain

independent in order to form accurate judgements. In contrast, this dissertation has shown that
decentralized networks can allow social learning to increase the accuracy of beliefs within groups,
even when the average belief remains unchanged. Theoretical results presented in Chapter 3
predict that the benefit to individuals is a robust expectation that can hold under a wide range of
plausible conditions, even where the average belief becomes less accurate. Moreover, our results
indicate that social influence in decentralized networks can increase the accuracy of the average
belief itself—social influence can improve the wisdom of crowds estimate.
Together, chapter 2 and 3 demonstrate that the positive effects of social influence on belief
accuracy hold across two distinct types of estimation tasks. While chapter 2 demonstrates the
potential for social influence to improve the accuracy of arithmetic estimates, chapter 3
demonstrates how social networks can alleviate a tension intrinsic to financial markets. Equilibrium
theories such as the efficient markets hypothesis argue that the aggregated decisions of many
people produce market prices that accurately reflect the future value of assets, even as those
markets are marked by enormous inequality in the distribution of profits. Moreover, retail investors
tend to lose money compared to standard benchmarks, highlighting a stark divergence between
collective efficiency and individual performance. By allowing individuals to learn from each other,
Chapter 2 showed how social influence can reduce the inequality of belief accuracy between
individuals. These results suggest that, when these beliefs are translated into decisions, social
influence has the potential to reduce the

inequality of success within financial markets by

distributing gains more equally. In contrast with intuitive concerns that social influence in financial
markets can lead to herding dynamics, the results presented in Chapter 2 suggest that social
influence can improve individual performance without undermining market efficiency.
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Remarkably, the results presented in Chapter 2 show more than just individual
improvement as groups converge toward an accurate wisdom-of-crowds estimate. My analysis of
arithmetic estimates found that, unexpectedly, the mean belief itself became more accurate. This
result is not predicted by the DeGroot model under the assumption that responsiveness to social
influence is identically distributed throughout a population. Instead, explaining the increase in
accuracy of the group mean requires accounting for an empirical correlation between individual
accuracy and individual response to social information. Notably, although the overall improvement
in group accuracy was not statistically significant for financial forecasting tasks, both arithmetic
estimation tasks and financial forecasting tasks demonstrated a positive correlation between
accuracy and response to social information. These results suggest that the qualitative dynamics
of collective intelligence are comparable for both arithmetic estimates and financial forecasting.
The null result for financial forecasting is likely explained by the high initial accuracy, which left
limited room for improvement and thus reduced the statistical power of detecting a decrease in the
accuracy of the average belief.
There are several hypothetical explanations for this correlation between accuracy and
response to social information. Survey-based research on estimate accuracy discussed in Chapter
1 suggests that individuals who are more accurate are also more confident, and that individuals
who are more confident are less responsive to social influence. However, this explanation begs
the question: why are individuals who are more accurate also more confident? One simple
possibility is that some individuals put more cognitive effort into the task at hand (e.g., counting
gumballs or studying relevant information for a financial forecast) which produces greater accuracy
while also limiting the amount of attention available for social information. A second possibility is
that some individuals have greater skill for the task at hand and also, consciously or
subconsciously, are aware of their greater skill—as a result, the rational behavior would be to place
less weight on social information. Yet another possibility is that innate estimation ability correlates
with social intelligence: if people who have greater ability are also less likely to attend to social
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information due to personality characteristics, this correlation between accuracy and response to
social information will occur.
Any or all of these explanations may be true, but the crucial factor for the collective
dynamics of group belief formation is not why the correlation occurs but that the correlation occurs
at all—that people who are more accurate make smaller revisions. Although the theoretical model
presented in this dissertation indicates that the reason for this correlation should not matter, it
remains possible that the different cognitive models may yield different collective dynamics—just
as the initially unexpected heterogeneity between subjects produced qualitatively different
collective outcomes. Thus future psychological research may focus specifically on how the use of
social information relates to accuracy by identifying mediating factors (such as confidence or innate
ability).

To that end, these results show how research on collective dynamics can inform

psychological research, just as psychological research can inform theoretical models of collective
behavior. The results of this psychological research can then be analyzed with theoretical models
to form predictions for how different behavioral patterns within a population can produce different
collective outcomes.

Centralization.

Even as this dissertation identified the potential benefits of social influence in

decentralized networks, my theoretical model and empirical evidence also identified the potential
risks of social influence in centralized networks. When a social network is characterized by the
presence of one or a small number of highly central nodes, the effect of social influence depends
entirely on the accuracy of those central individuals: accurate central nodes will increase both
group-level and individual-level accuracy, and inaccurate central nodes will cause groups and
individuals to become less accurate.
The risks created by network centralization provide a key insight to into the wisdom of
crowds in practice. In the experiment presented in Chapter 2, centralization was generated by
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intentionally structured social networks. In practice, centralization can emerge endogenously, and
central nodes may not be randomly placed. For example, individuals may attain influential positions
due to status or perceived expertise. However, such individuals are not necessarily more likely to
be accurate. For example, in a study of an online social networks devoted to investment discussion,
Pan et al. (2012) found that individual popularity ranking is only loosely coupled to portfolio
performance. That is, the actual success of the investors is largely irrelevant to their influence.
Research on political influence networks have similarly found that people’s estimation of their peers’
political knowledge is only loosely coupled with the actual expertise of those peers (Klofstad, 2009).
As a result, it is likely that highly influential central nodes are frequently no more likely than any
other member of the population to hold accurate beliefs, generating effects similar to those
described in Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
Thus one important area for future research is to identify empirically whether influential
individuals are likely to hold more accurate beliefs. It is important to note that a correlation between
accuracy and influence is not sufficient to eliminate the risks associated with centralization. Even
where such a correlation exists, a noisy relationship can still undermine the wisdom of crowds as
compared with decentralized networks. The greater the accuracy of the population as a whole, the
stronger the correlation between accuracy and influence must be in order for central individuals to
improve the beliefs of the population as a whole.
The effect of network centralization also offers an important guideline for harnessing the
wisdom of crowds even in structured communication networks, especially since it is increasingly
common for organizations to design platforms with the explicit goal of generating accurate
economic and geopolitical forecasts (Bonabeau, 2009; Cowgill & Zitzewitz, 2009; Drogen & Jaha,
2013). However, one frequent practice in such contexts (e.g., on such forecasting platforms as
Vetr.com and the IARPA forecasting challenge) is to allow individuals to view aggregated
information on the estimates of other participants before providing their own estimate. Although
this process is not explicitly targeted at producing social networks, the chronological ordering
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effects of participants entering the system does create an emergent centralization:

those

individuals who provide their estimates earlier in the process will be more influential than those
individuals providing estimates later in the process. When this influence is mapped onto a directed
social network, the individuals who provide earlier estimates will have a greater centrality, and the
network as a whole will be centralized.
This dissertation draws attention to the importance of network structure and opens the door
for future research to identifying those ways in which social information exchange can shape
network structure as a result of both intentional and unintentional processes such as status and
platform design.

Limiting Assumptions and Next Steps. Both the theoretical model and experimental design
presented in this dissertation make several key assumptions. One assumption key to interpreting
the experimental results presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 is that allowing subjects to observe
the average belief of their peers will produce comparable results to showing subjects each
individual estimate by each peer. To some extent, this assumption is supported by prior empirical
research.

Lorenz et al. (2011) utilized both a full information condition and an aggregate

information condition, producing qualitatively comparable results at the group level. Madirolas and
Polavieja (2012) further analyze the data provided by Lorenz et al. (2011) and find that individuallevel behavior in the full information condition can be consistently explained under the assumption
that individuals make use of social information by adopting a weighted mean that combines their
own initial belief with aggregated social information—precisely the model described in chapter 2.
However, while these results show that behavior is largely consistent with the assumption that
aggregated information is equivalent to detailed information, it is not definitive proof. Moreover,
these results may not generalize to situations outside the laboratory, especially where factors such
as social identity may lead individuals to place different weight on information coming from different
classes of peers.
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One key direction for future research is to understand empirically how people make use of
social information in practice. After identifying empirical behavioral practices, this research will be
able to make use of the general theoretical model presented in Chapter 2 to understand how such
individual behavior impacts group belief formation. In political belief formation, for example, one
common theory is that partisan bias leads people to make differential use of social information
when it is presented by copartisans versus members of competing political ideology. Current
research addressing this possibility is exploring the effect of providing partisan indicators along with
numeric signals, finding that partisan indicators do not qualitatively change the effects of social
information but do change the magnitude of effects:

individuals make more use of social

information in the absence of partisan signals (Guilbeault, Becker, & Centola, 2018). This research
is also exploring how individuals respond to social information when people are shown detailed
estimation that includes not only individual beliefs but also identity information about the individuals
holding those beliefs.
Another key design feature of this dissertation is the explicit and sole use of numeric signals
as a mechanism for conveying information about peer beliefs. In practice, however, social
information can be exchanged through open discussion that includes not only numeric signals but
also complex arguments, status signals, and other detailed information. One critical for future
research is identifying whether such detailed discussion inhibits or enhances the wisdom of crowds.
One possibility is that detailed discussion allows individuals to exchange status information which
leads to unintentional influence centralization, thus undermining the wisdom of crowds. However,
another possibility is that detailed discussion allows individuals to exchange factual and logical
arguments which enhance decision-making.

Discussion may also allow people to exchange

confidence signals, enabling the group to collectively place more weight on accurate beliefs.
For each of the open questions discussed in this conclusion, the continued use of digital
platforms as a mechanism for experimental research will play a vital role in determining how
researchers and practitioners can relax the assumptions underlying this dissertation. By allowing
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careful experimental control over subject interactions, digital platforms will allow researchers to
relax assumptions iteratively, gradually increasing the complexity of interactions as well as the type
of social information exchanged. The high fidelity data collection enabled by digital platforms will
also allow researchers to closely analyze and model the social processes that unfold in different
types of interactions. Because the theoretical model presented in Chapter 2 provides a general
framework for describing influence networks, all of these iterations can be directly compared to the
findings presented in this dissertation.
Communication in practice is increasingly mediated by digital platforms, and the precise
control enabled by web-based tools can provide an advantage not only in experimental design but
also in implementation. Even with minimal modification, the experimental protocol used in chapters
2 and 3 can be readily adapted for implementation in decision-making contexts.

For example,

current research is investigating how this protocol can be applied in the context of mobile
technology to support medical decision-making by physicians (Centola, Becker, Aysola, & Zhang,
2018). As I push forward to address more complex questions, such as the role of argumentation
and other detailed discussion, I will investigate the principles of managed communication to
understand how digital technology can be optimally designed to enable social networks of all types
to grow their collective intelligence and harness the wisdom of crowds.

97

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Acemoglu, D., Dahleh, M. A., Lobel, I., & Ozdaglar, A. (2011). Bayesian learning in social
networks. The Review of Economic Studies, 78(4), 1201–1236.
Acemoglu, D., & Ozdaglar, A. (2011). Opinion dynamics and learning in social networks. Dynamic
Games and Applications, 1(1), 3–49.
Armstrong, J. S. (2006). How to Make Better Forecasts and Decisions: Avoid Face-to-face
Meetings. Foresight: The International Journal of Applied Forecasting, (5).
Arrow, K. J., Forsythe, R., Gorham, M., Hahn, R., Hanson, R., Ledyard, J. O., … Nelson, F. D.
(2008). The promise of prediction markets. Science-New York Then Washington-,
320(5878), 877.
Asch, S. E. (1951). Effects of group pressure upon the modification and distortion of judgments.
Groups, Leadership, and Men. S, 222–236.
Atanasov, P., Rescober, P., Stone, E., Swift, S. A., Servan-Schreiber, E., Tetlock, P., … Mellers, B.
(2016a). Distilling the wisdom of crowds: Prediction markets vs. prediction polls.
Management Science, 63(3), 691–706.
Atanasov, P., Rescober, P., Stone, E., Swift, S. A., Servan-Schreiber, E., Tetlock, P., … Mellers, B.
(2016b). Distilling the wisdom of crowds: Prediction markets vs. prediction polls.
Management Science, 63(3), 691–706.
Baddeley, M. (2010). Herding, social influence and economic decision-making: sociopsychological and neuroscientific analyses. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society B: Biological Sciences, 365(1538), 281–290.

98

Bailey, D. E., Leonardi, P. M., & Barley, S. R. (2012). The Lure of the Virtual. Organization Science,
23(5), 1485–1504.
Baker, H. K., & Nofsinger, J. R. (2002). Psychological biases of investors. Financial Services
Review, 11(2), 97.
Bala, V., & Goyal, S. (1998). Learning from neighbours. The Review of Economic Studies, 65(3),
595–621.
Banerjee, A. V. (1992). A simple model of herd behavior. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
107(3), 797–817.
Barabâsi, A.-L., Jeong, H., Néda, Z., Ravasz, E., Schubert, A., & Vicsek, T. (2002). Evolution of the
social network of scientific collaborations. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and Its
Applications, 311(3), 590–614.
Barber, B. M., Lee, Y.-T., Liu, Y.-J., & Odean, T. (2009). Just how much do individual investors lose
by trading? Review of Financial Studies, 22(2), 609–632.
Barber, B. M., & Odean, T. (2000). Trading is hazardous to your wealth: The common stock
investment performance of individual investors. The Journal of Finance, 55(2), 773–806.
Bavelas, A. (1950). Communication patterns in task-oriented groups. The Journal of the
Acoustical Society of America, 22(6), 725–730.
Becker, J., Brackbill, D., & Centola, D. (2017). Network Dynamics of Social Influence in the
Wisdom of Crowds. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 114(26), E5070–
E5076.
Becker, J., & Centola, D. (2018). From Efficient Markets to Effective Investors - Individuals and
the Wisdom of Crowds. Unpublished Manuscript.

99

Bem, D. J. (1967). Self-perception: An alternative interpretation of cognitive dissonance
phenomena. Psychological Review, 74(3), 183.
Bhattacharya, U., Hackethal, A., Kaesler, S., Loos, B., & Meyer, S. (2012). Is Unbiased Financial
Advice to Retail Investors Sufficient? Answers from a Large Field Study. The Review of
Financial Studies, 25(4), 975–1032.
Bikhchandani, S., Hirshleifer, D., & Welch, I. (1992). A theory of fads, fashion, custom, and
cultural change as informational cascades. Journal of Political Economy, 992–1026.
Blume, L. E. (1993). The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction. Games and Economic
Behavior, 5(3), 387–424.
Bollen, J., Mao, H., & Zeng, X. (2011). Twitter mood predicts the stock market. Journal of
Computational Science, 2(1), 1–8.
Bonabeau, E. (2009). Decisions 2.0: The power of collective intelligence. MIT Sloan Management
Review, 50(2), 45.
Bruce, R. S. (1935). Group judgments in the fields of lifted weights and visual discrimination. The
Journal of Psychology, 1(1), 117–121.
Budescu, D. V., & Chen, E. (2014). Identifying expertise to extract the wisdom of crowds.
Management Science, 61(2), 267–280.
Burt, R. S. (1987). Social contagion and innovation: Cohesion versus structural equivalence.
American Journal of Sociology, 1287–1335.
Castellano, C., Fortunato, S., & Loreto, V. (2009). Statistical physics of social dynamics. Reviews
of Modern Physics, 81(2), 591.
Casti, J. L. (1996). Seeing the light at El Farol: a look at the most important problem in complex
systems theory. Complexity, 1(5), 7–10.
100

Celis, L. E., Krafft, P. M., & Kobe, N. (2016). Sequential Voting Promotes Collective Discovery in
Social Recommendation Systems. Retrieved from https://arxiv.org/abs/1603.04466
Centola, D., & Baronchelli, A. (2015). The spontaneous emergence of conventions: An
experimental study of cultural evolution. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, 112(7), 1989–1994.
Centola, D., Becker, J., Aysola, J., & Zhang, J. (2018). Improving Medical Decision Making through
the Wisdom of Crowds. In Preparation.
Centola, D., Willer, R., & Macy, M. (2005). The Emperor’s Dilemma: A Computational Model of
Self-Enforcing Norms1. American Journal of Sociology, 110(4), 1009–1040.
Chater, N., Huck, S., & Inderst, R. (2010). Consumer decision-making in retail investment
services: A behavioural economics perspective. Report to the European
Commission/SANCO.
Chen, H., De, P., Hu, Y. J., & Hwang, B.-H. (2014). Wisdom of crowds: The value of stock opinions
transmitted through social media. Review of Financial Studies, 27(5), 1367–1403.
Cialdini, R. B., & Goldstein, N. J. (2004). Social influence: Compliance and conformity. Annu. Rev.
Psychol., 55, 591–621.
Clemen, R. T. (1989). Combining forecasts: A review and annotated bibliography. International
Journal of Forecasting, 5(4), 559–583.
Cowgill, B., & Zitzewitz, E. (2015). Corporate prediction markets: Evidence from google, ford, and
firm x. The Review of Economic Studies, rdv014.
Dalkey, N., & Helmer, O. (1963). An experimental application of the Delphi method to the use of
experts. Management Science, 9(3), 458–467.

101

Dall’Asta, L., Baronchelli, A., Barrat, A., & Loreto, V. (2006). Nonequilibrium dynamics of
language games on complex networks. Physical Review E, 74(3), 036105.
Davis, G. F., & Greve, H. R. (1997). Corporate elite networks and governance changes in the
1980s. American Journal of Sociology, 103(1), 1–37.
DeDeo, S. (2014). Group minds and the case of Wikipedia. Human Computation, 1 (1), 2014.
Human Computation, 1.
DeGroot, M. H. (1974). Reaching a consensus. Journal of the American Statistical Association,
69(345), 118–121.
DeMarzo, P. M., Vayanos, D., & Zwiebel, J. (2003). Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and
Unidimensional Opinions. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(3), 909–968.
Deutsch, M., & Gerard, H. B. (1955). A study of normative and informational social influences
upon individual judgment. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 51(3), 629.
Drogen, L. A., & Jha, V. (2013). Generating Abnormal Returns Using Crowdsourced Earnings
Forecasts from Estimize.
Eagle, N., & Pentland, A. S. (2006). Reality mining: sensing complex social systems. Personal and
Ubiquitous Computing, 10(4), 255–268.
Ebel, H., Mielsch, L.-I., & Bornholdt, S. (2002). Scale-free topology of e-mail networks. Physical
Review E, 66(3), 035103.
Economo, E., Hong, L., & Page, S. E. (2016). Social structure, endogenous diversity, and collective
accuracy. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 125, 212–231.
Ellison, G. (1993). Learning, local interaction, and coordination. Econometrica: Journal of the
Econometric Society, 1047–1071.

102

Ellison, G. (2000). Basins of attraction, long-run stochastic stability, and the speed of step-bystep evolution. The Review of Economic Studies, 67(1), 17–45.
Fama, E. F. (1970). Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work. The Journal
of Finance, 25(2), 383–417.
Farrell, S. (2011). Social influence benefits the wisdom of individuals in the crowd. Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences, 108(36), E625–E625.
Festinger, L., & Carlsmith, J. M. (1959). Cognitive consequences of forced compliance. The
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 58(2), 203.
Fisher, K. L., & Statman, M. (2000). Cognitive biases in market forecasts. Journal of Portfolio
Management, 27(1), 72–81.
Fishkin, J. S., & Luskin, R. C. (2005). Experimenting with a democratic ideal: Deliberative polling
and public opinion. Acta Politica, 40(3), 284–298.
Freeman, L. C. (1978). Centrality in social networks conceptual clarification. Social Networks,
1(3), 215–239.
Galton, F. (1907). Vox populi (The wisdom of crowds). Nature, 75, 450–51.
Golub, B., & Jackson, M. O. (2010). Naive learning in social networks and the wisdom of crowds.
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2(1), 112–149.
Golub, B., & Sadler, E. D. (2017). Learning in social networks.
Gordon, K. (1924). Group Judgments in the Field of Lifted Weights. Journal of Experimental
Psychology, 7(5), 398.
Graefe, A. (2014). Accuracy of vote expectation surveys in forecasting elections. Public Opinion
Quarterly, 78(S1), 204–232.

103

Green, K. C., Armstrong, J. S., & Graefe, A. (2007). Methods to elicit forecasts from groups:
Delphi and prediction markets compared. Foresight: The International Journal of Applied
Forecasting, (8), 17–20.
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. (1998). Measuring individual differences in
implicit cognition: the implicit association test. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 74(6), 1464.
Guilbeault, D., Becker, J., & Centola, D. (2018). Bipartisan Social Networks Reduce Political Bias
in the Interpretation of Climate Trends. Under Review.
Gürçay, B., Mellers, B. A., & Baron, J. (2015). The power of social influence on estimation
accuracy. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 28(3), 250–261.
Gustafson, D. H., Shukla, R. K., Delbecq, A., & Walster, G. W. (1973). A comparative study of
differences in subjective likelihood estimates made by individuals, interacting groups,
Delphi groups, and nominal groups. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance,
9(2), 280–291.
Hardin, G. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. Science, 162(3859), 1243–1248.
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.162.3859.1243
Herzog, S. M., & Hertwig, R. (2009). The wisdom of many in one mind: Improving individual
judgments with dialectical bootstrapping. Psychological Science, 20(2), 231–237.
Herzog, S. M., & Hertwig, R. (2011). The wisdom of ignorant crowds: Predicting sport outcomes
by mere recognition. Judgment and Decision Making, 6(1), 58.
Hogarth, R. M. (1978). A note on aggregating opinions. Organizational Behavior and Human
Performance, 21(1), 40–46.

104

Hong, H., Du, Q., Wang, G., Fan, W., & Xu, D. (2016). Crowd Wisdom: The Impact of Opinion
Diversity and Participant Independence on Crowd Performance.
Hong, L., & Page, S. E. (2008). Some microfoundations of collective wisdom. In H. Landemore &
J. Elster (Eds.), Collective Wisdom (pp. 56–71). Cambridge University Press.
Hong, L., & Page, S. E. (2009). Generated and interpreted signals. Journal of Economic Theory,
144(5), 2174–2196.
Hooker, R. H. (1907). Mean or median. Nature, 75(1951), 487.
Janis, I. L. (1982). Groupthink: Psychological studies of policy decisions and fiascoes (Vol. 349).
Houghton Mifflin Boston.
Jansen, W. J., Jin, X., & de Winter, J. M. (2016). Forecasting and nowcasting real GDP: Comparing
statistical models and subjective forecasts. International Journal of Forecasting, 32(2),
411–436.
Jenness, A. (1932). The role of discussion in changing opinion regarding a matter of fact. Journal
of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 27(3), 279–296.
Judd, S., Kearns, M., & Vorobeychik, Y. (2010). Behavioral dynamics and influence in networked
coloring and consensus. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107(34),
14978–14982.
Juni, M. Z., & Eckstein, M. P. (2017). The wisdom of crowds for visual search. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, 114(21), E4306–E4315.
Kahneman, D., & Riepe, M. W. (1998). Aspects of investor psychology. Journal of Portfolio
Management, 24(4), 52–+.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1977). Intuitive prediction: Biases and corrective procedures. DTIC
Document.
105

Kandori, M., Mailath, G. J., & Rob, R. (1993). Learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in
games. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 29–56.
Kao, A. B., Berdahl, A. M., Hartnett, A. T., Lutz, M. J., Bak-Coleman, J. B., Ioannou, C. C., …
Couzin, I. D. (2018). Counteracting estimation bias and social influence to improve the
wisdom of crowds. BioRxiv, 288191.
Kauffman, S. A. (1993). The origins of order: Self-organization and selection in evolution. Oxford
University Press, USA.
Kelley, E. K., & Tetlock, P. C. (2013). How wise are crowds? Insights from retail orders and stock
returns. The Journal of Finance, 68(3), 1229–1265.
Khatib, F., Cooper, S., Tyka, M. D., Xu, K., Makedon, I., Popović, Z., & Baker, D. (2011). Algorithm
discovery by protein folding game players. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, 108(47), 18949–18953.
Kittur, A., & Kraut, R. E. (2008). Harnessing the wisdom of crowds in wikipedia: quality through
coordination. In Proceedings of the 2008 ACM conference on Computer supported
cooperative work (pp. 37–46). ACM.
Klugman, S. F. (1945). Group Judgments for Familiar and Unfamiliar Materials. The Journal of
General Psychology, 32(1), 103–110. https://doi.org/10.1080/00221309.1945.10544484
Klugman, S. F. (1947). Group and individual judgments for anticipated events. The Journal of
Social Psychology, 26(1), 21–28.
Knight, H. C. (1921). A comparison of the reliability of group and individual judgments (PhD
Thesis). Columbia University (1921?).
Koriat, A. (2012). When are two heads better than one and why? Science, 336(6079), 360–362.

106

Kossinets, G., & Watts, D. J. (2006). Empirical analysis of an evolving social network. Science,
311(5757), 88–90.
Krackhardt, D., & Hanson, J. R. (2001). 16 informal networks: The company behind the chart.
Creative Management, 202.
Krafft, P. M., Zheng, J., Pan, W., Della Penna, N., Altshuler, Y., Shmueli, E., … Pentland, A. (2016).
Human collective intelligence as distributed Bayesian inference. ArXiv Preprint
ArXiv:1608.01987.
Kurvers, R. H., Herzog, S. M., Hertwig, R., Krause, J., Carney, P. A., Bogart, A., … Wolf, M. (2016).
Boosting medical diagnostics by pooling independent judgments. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, 201601827.
Langer, E. J., & Roth, J. (1975). Heads I win, tails it’s chance: The illusion of control as a function
of the sequence of outcomes in a purely chance task. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 32(6), 951.
Lazer, D., & Friedman, A. (2007). The network structure of exploration and exploitation.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 52(4), 667–694.
Lazer, D., & Radford, J. (2017). Data ex Machina: Introduction to Big Data. Annual Review of
Sociology, 43, 19–39.
Lewis, D. (1969). Convention: A philosophical study. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Liljeros, F., Edling, C. R., Amaral, L. A. N., Stanley, H. E., & Aberg, Y. (2001). The web of human
sexual contacts. Nature, 411(6840), 907–908.
Lorenz, J., Rauhut, H., Schweitzer, F., & Helbing, D. (2011). How social influence can undermine
the wisdom of crowd effect. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108(22),
9020–9025.
107

Madirolas, G., & de Polavieja, G. G. (2015). Improving collective estimations using resistance to
social influence. PLoS Computational Biology, 11(11), e1004594.
Malkiel, B. (2016). A Random Walk Down Wall Street. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.
Malkiel, B. G. (2003). The efficient market hypothesis and its critics. Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 17(1), 59–82.
Malone, T. W., & Bernstein, M. S. (2015). Handbook of collective intelligence. MIT Press.
Mannes, A. E., Soll, J. B., & Larrick, R. P. (2014). The wisdom of select crowds. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 107(2), 276.
Mellers, B., Ungar, L., Baron, J., Ramos, J., Gurcay, B., Fincher, K., … others. (2014). Psychological
strategies for winning a geopolitical forecasting tournament. Psychological Science,
25(5), 1106–1115.
Montanari, A., & Saberi, A. (2010). The spread of innovations in social networks. Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences, 107(47), 20196–20201.
Mossel, E., Sly, A., & Tamuz, O. (2015). Strategic learning and the topology of social networks.
Econometrica, 83(5), 1755–1794.
Mossel, E., & Tamuz, O. (2017). Opinion exchange dynamics. Probability Surveys, 14, 155–204.
Moussaïd, M., Kämmer, J. E., Analytis, P. P., & Neth, H. (2013). Social influence and the collective
dynamics of opinion formation. PLoS One, 8(11), e78433.
Mozer, M. C., Pashler, H., & Homaei, H. (2008). Optimal predictions in everyday cognition: The
wisdom of individuals or crowds? Cognitive Science, 32(7), 1133–1147.
Murr, A. E. (2015). The wisdom of crowds: Applying Condorcet’s jury theorem to forecasting US
presidential elections. International Journal of Forecasting, 31(3), 916–929.

108

Myers, D. G., & Bishop, G. D. (1971). Enhancement of dominant attitudes in group discussion.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 20(3), 386.
Navajas, J., Niella, T., Garbulsky, G., Bahrami, B., & Sigman, M. (2018). Aggregated knowledge
from a small number of debates outperforms the wisdom of large crowds. Nature
Human Behaviour, 2, 1.
Niederer, S., & Van Dijck, J. (2010). Wisdom of the crowd or technicity of content? Wikipedia as
a sociotechnical system. New Media & Society, 12(8), 1368–1387.
Nofer, M., & Hinz, O. (2014). Are crowds on the internet wiser than experts? The case of a stock
prediction community. Journal of Business Economics, 84(3), 303–338.
Page, S. E. (2007). The difference: How the power of diversity creates better groups, firms,
schools, and societies. Princeton University Press.
Pan, W., Altshuler, Y., & Pentland, A. (2012). Decoding social influence and the wisdom of the
crowd in financial trading network. In Privacy, Security, Risk and Trust (PASSAT), 2012
International Conference on and 2012 International Confernece on Social Computing
(SocialCom) (pp. 203–209). IEEE.
Peeters, T. (2018). Testing the Wisdom of Crowds in the field: Transfermarkt valuations and
international soccer results. International Journal of Forecasting, 34(1), 17–29.
Prelec, D., Seung, H. S., & McCoy, J. (2017). A solution to the single-question crowd wisdom
problem. Nature, 541(7638), 532–535.
Rowe, G., & Wright, G. (1999). The Delphi technique as a forecasting tool: issues and analysis.
International Journal of Forecasting, 15(4), 353–375.

109

Schijven, M., & Hitt, M. A. (2012). The vicarious wisdom of crowds: Toward a behavioral
perspective on investor reactions to acquisition announcements. Strategic Management
Journal, 33(11), 1247–1268.
Sherif, M. (1935). A study of some social factors in perception. Archives of Psychology (Columbia
University). Retrieved from http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/1936-01332-001
Shi, F., Teplitskiy, M., Duede, E., & Evans, J. (2017). The Wisdom of Polarized Crowds. ArXiv
Preprint ArXiv:1712.06414.
Shiller, R. J. (2003). From efficient markets theory to behavioral finance. The Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 17(1), 83–104.
Shore, J., Bernstein, E., & Lazer, D. (2015). Facts and figuring: An experimental investigation of
network structure and performance in information and solution spaces. Organization
Science, 26(5), 1432–1446.
Sjöberg, L. (2009). Are all crowds equally wise? A comparison of political election forecasts by
experts and the public. Journal of Forecasting, 28(1), 1–18.
Stroebe, W., Nijstad, B. A., & Rietzschel, E. F. (2010). Chapter four-beyond productivity loss in
brainstorming groups: The evolution of a question. Advances in Experimental Social
Psychology, 43, 157–203.
Sunstein, C. R. (2006). Infotopia: How many minds produce knowledge. Oxford University Press.
Surowiecki, J. (2004). The wisdom of crowds. Anchor.
Tziralis, G., & Tatsiopoulos, I. (2012). Prediction markets: An extended literature review. The
Journal of Prediction Markets, 1(1), 75–91.

110

Way, S. F., Morgan, A. C., Clauset, A., & Larremore, D. B. (2017). The misleading narrative of the
canonical faculty productivity trajectory. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, 201702121. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1702121114
Welinder, P., Branson, S., Perona, P., & Belongie, S. J. (2010). The multidimensional wisdom of
crowds. In Advances in neural information processing systems (pp. 2424–2432).
Wolf, M., Krause, J., Carney, P. A., Bogart, A., & Kurvers, R. H. J. M. (2015). Collective intelligence
meets medical decision-making: the collective outperforms the best radiologist. PloS
One, 10(8), e0134269.
Wolfers, J., & Zitzewitz, E. (2004). Prediction markets. National Bureau of Economic Research.
Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/papers/w10504
Wolfers, J., & Zitzewitz, E. (2006). Interpreting prediction market prices as probabilities. National
Bureau of Economic Research. Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/papers/w12200
Woolley, A. W., Chabris, C. F., Pentland, A., Hashmi, N., & Malone, T. W. (2010). Evidence for a
collective intelligence factor in the performance of human groups. Science, 330(6004),
686–688.
Wright, P. (1974). The harassed decision maker: Time pressures, distractions, and the use of
evidence. Journal of Applied Psychology, 59(5), 555.
Young, H. P. (1993). The evolution of conventions. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric
Society, 57–84.
Zajonc, R. B. (1962). A note on group judgements and group size. Human Relations, 15(2), 177–
180.
Zarnowitz, V. (1984). The accuracy of individual and group forecasts from business outlook
surveys. Journal of Forecasting, 3(1), 11–26.
111

